French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius (L) speaks with Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jabor Al-Thani of Qatar as they attend a 'Friends of Syria' meeting at the Dolmabahce Palace in Istanbul[/caption]The political turmoil that has defined the Arab world since the beginning of 2011 and that has so far resulted in the fall of four regimes (in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen) has also opened the door for a period of foreign policy activism by the Arab Gulf states. Qatar has been at the forefront of this activism by displaying a readiness to engage and mobilize clear positions with regard to the developments in the region, something that stands very much in contrast to the more common ostrich mentality of the past, where the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States largely shied away from any sort of publicity, never mind encouraging active intervention in the internal affairs of other states. While Qatar has embraced the Arab uprisings as an opportunity to put itself on the international diplomatic map, other GCC states such as the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia have also been more outspoken and have engaged with regional affairs, thus underlining their pragmatic ability to adjust to the changing circumstances with which the Middle East as a whole finds itself confronted.
Given the numerous implications that political change in the Arab world holds for the Arab Gulf states, the manner in which these countries have structured their responses has differed depending on their own assessments about the potential consequences and impact. This can be seen in the example of how Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have pursued their foreign policy when it comes to such issues as Syria and Libya. It is also reflected in how these two countries perceive the role being played by the Muslim Brotherhood as a political force that is influencing many of the developments in the Arab world at present.
The general characterization of the Arab Gulf States within the context of the political turmoil in the region has been one of being counter-revolutionary, and as actively trying to stem themselves against calls for change and reform. The notion is one where the GCC states are determined to prevent the chaos from spreading to their own countries, to shore up the monarchical system of power, and to prop up existing regimes against their present opposition.
[inset_left]The Qatari government has sent a clear signal that it is ready to take on more responsibility on the foreign policy front.[/inset_left]
Yet in Libya, it was the GCC state of Qatar that stood at the forefront of organizing the opposition from the Arab side against the Qadhafi regime, with a supporting role played by the UAE. The movement spearheaded by Qatar provided Arab legitimacy to the NATO-led operation in Libya, which ultimately sought and resulted in regime change. As conditions have deteriorated in Syria, it was again Qatar (as well as Saudi Arabia) that started financially to support the Syrian opposition, even suggesting that the UN Security Council apply Chapter VII to permit military intervention. While such actions can be seen as responding to public sympathy for the plight of the Syrian people and a genuine belief that the violence must end, it has also served to position Qatar as a responsible and progressive member of the international community.
A closer look, however, also reveals some subtle difference. The Qatari government has sent a clear signal that it is ready to take on more responsibility on the foreign policy front and engage itself more deeply in the affairs of other states. Equally, it has shown that it is ready to take greater risks. In the Libyan case, Qatar did not limit itself to a variety of public statements, but it put its resources on the ground. Qatar also did not limit its involvement in Libya through the NATO framework only, but was far more active in terms of supplying arms to the Qadhafi opposition, selling oil on the open market, and providing financial aid that proved quite critical in determining the outcome. What Qatar did was take the lead and set the terms of debate. As a result, it has made the assessment that its involvement in Libya was not wrong.
Qatar’s readiness to engage is certainly related to the fact that it can draw on a level of experience gained in recent years. The case of Libya was not Qatar’s entrance on the regional stage; rather, the country had engaged in series of mediating attempts prior to Libya, for example in the Darfur conflict in Sudan, the Polisario in the Western Sahara, and the Houthi rebellion in Yemen. Qatar has also not been shy about publicizing its involvement in these various issues, and it displays a heightened sense of self-confidence to the point that it is even fully aware of the fact that such activism also generates various degrees of criticism. In this context, the most important tool at the disposal of Qatar is the Al-Jazeera satellite network, which has proven a critical instrument through which the country can operate.
In contrast, a country like the UAE continues to prefer to operate within the framework of an alliance, for example, the GCC or NATO, or with the support of the United States rather than going it alone. As far as Libya and Syria are concerned, the UAE has displayed a higher degree of sensitivity when it comes to its foreign involvement and it is not ready to the degree that Qatar has shown to go out on a limb or risk outside criticism. In Syria, the UAE has not taken on a visible role, in turn limiting its involvement to sponsoring the economic recovery and development working group of the Friends of Syria circle alongside Germany. Both countries fund the secretariat, which is to be located in Berlin. The UAE position is due in part to an evaluation by the UAE leadership that their experience in Libya was not solely positive, and that therefore a more cautious position is warranted. Furthermore, the UAE is a country that does not have the same experience when it comes to mediating conflict as Qatar. The UAE is thus a newcomer, which explains this more behind-the scenes approach.
Qatar and the UAE have contrasting policies as far as the Muslim Brotherhood is concerned. While Qatar maintains close ties to the various Islamist forces that are now emerging across the Middle East, even providing a platform for broadcasting Muslim Brotherhood ideas through Shaikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, the UAE has come to define Muslim Brotherhood policy as a direct threat to regime rule in the Arab Gulf and has taken direct steps to undermine the Islamist message throughout the region, including at home. While Qatar again seeks to define the discourse and shape the course of events as best as it can, the UAE takes a more reactive position that warns of possible dangers ahead.
Taken together, both Qatar and the UAE do want to send a message to the United States as well as the broader international community that they are trustful allies who are ready to assume responsibility when it comes to the alliance or international obligations. In this sense, NATO as an organization is seen as a critical tool, and as a result both countries have fostered strong relations with NATO through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative framework. The same goes for working through such organizations as the Arab League or the Gulf Cooperation Council. The difference is that Qatar has been more proactive in filling the void that currently exists as far as Middle East diplomacy is concerned. For the moment, the risks have paid off, but down the road the more cautious approach of the UAE might pay greater dividends.
