The seasons go by but Syria’s Arab Spring shows no sign of passing. Bashar Al-Assad’s strategy remains that of buying himself more time, in the hopes that a combination of domestic repression and international diplomacy will allow him to weather the crisis and hold on to power. However, as the ranks of the opposition continue to grow, it seems increasingly unlikely that Assad will manage to postpone his fall for much longer.
The prospects for the future of Syria do not look bright. Even in the event of regime change and free elections, it would be difficult to avert a protracted sectarian conflict. Assad effectively holds the entire Alawi community hostage. Indeed, he has managed convince them that their fate and that of the regime are inextricably linked.
[inset_left]It would be difficult to avert a protracted sectarian conflict[/inset_left]It is true that Alawi are overrepresented in positions of power. They make up only 12 percent of the population and up to 90 percent of army officers. They also dominate the upper echelons of the Ba’ath Party and key state institutions. Yet, in a community of approximately two million, those who enjoy power and wealth are actually a very small fraction. The reality is that most Alawi are no better off than their fellow Syrians, who belong to other religious and ethnic groups. But communal loyalty and fear of retaliation in a post-Assad Syria make it easy for the regime to manipulate the community into resisting the uprising.
What is most worrisome about the civil strife in Syria is that it pits Sunnis against Alawi, in a clear civil war dynamic. The Sunni Arab majority, which comprises over 60 percent of the population, spearheaded the uprising, and consequently bore the brunt of state repression. The battlegrounds of Homs, Daraa, and Hama are all predominantly Sunni towns. And the army defectors who joined the Free Syrian Army are also by and large Sunni.
It is worth noting that the opposition has gone to great lengths not to appear sectarian. In a recent meeting in Tunis, the Syrian National Council, which claims to speak for the opposition as a whole, stated that Alawi have nothing to fear as long as they “let Assad go.” But it is unclear whether this organization truly speaks for the Syrian opposition as a whole, and what impact several more months of violence may have on the increasingly tense communal relations.
In any case, the opposition now has momentum. The sharp rise in violence that began in mid-December is proof that the state is struggling to contain the uprising—and the growing number of army defections sustaining it. Moreover, the Kurds, which were for the most part neutral in the initial stages of the revolution, are now joining the ranks of the opposition in large numbers.
Syrian Kurds, who represent approximately 10 percent of the population, at first refrained from taking one side or the other en masse. The Kurds’ cautious stance was due in part to the fear that their overall situation might worsen under a Sunni Arab government—and to a lesser extent to the Assad regime’s historical support of the PKK cause in Turkey. Some protests did break out in the Kurdish northeast in the early stages of the uprising. But the tipping point for the community was the assassination of a popular Kurdish leader, Mashaal Tammo, in October. The Kurds have considerable political weight in Syria, beyond what their numbers would suggest. The fact that neighboring Iraq has a strong autonomous Kurdish region and that Turkey has a large, politically active Kurdish minority means that Syrian Kurds have considerable strategic depth and bargaining power. Their support for the uprising may ultimately prove crucial in the overthrowing of Assad.
Syrian Christians, on the other hand, are much more isolated. Despite representing about 10 percent of the population, they do not have any real allies, at home or abroad. Many within the community seem to prefer the Assad regime to an uncertain future in which a Sunni Islamist political party is likely to takeover. Yet, Christians remain wary of openly embracing the loyalist cause, lest they be singled out for retaliation in the eventuality of regime change. After all, they are aware that in neighboring countries Christian communities are not faring well. In Iraq, Christians have been decimated by relentless insurgent attacks, while in Lebanon they have lost much of their political clout, due to both demographic and political pressures.
The position of Syrian Christians is complicated by the fact that their religion links them to the West, in a time in which the West is extremely unpopular in the Middle East. Any attempt by a European power such as France to intervene forcefully on behalf of the Christian minority would probably backfire, further isolating the community in a region that remains bitter about Western imperialism. Therefore, the best bet for the Christian community in Syria may well be to keep a low profile and see what happens.
What keeps the Assad regime in power is the steadfast support of the Alawi community, which serves as the glue holding together the army and the other branches of the security apparatus. The regime is likely to survive until it manages to keep the community united in the belief that regime change would herald massacres and ruin. Of course, top officials know that if the government were to fall they would certainly face death or lengthy prison terms. But the same is not true for the vast majority of Alawi. The only way Syria might avoid a civil war is for the Alawi minority to realize that supporting the regime is a lost cause and that switching sides is the most rational decision to contain losses and move on in a new world.
