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Contemporary Iraq is a divided nation, beset by sectarianism and violence and hostage to the interests of a self-serving political elite. Whether Iraq is a democracy or not is a polarizing question, one that often leads to lengthy disputes over the aims and impact of the US occupation. An impartial assessment, however, requires us to make a distinction between the reality of life within Iraq and the nature of the country’s political system.
Iraq has some noteworthy democratic elements: a constitution that was approved by the public in a national referendum; a popularly elected legislature; and a resurgent civil society prepared to stage public demonstrations demanding political rights. Thus, while Iraq is a severely flawed democracy that has repeatedly dashed the hopes and aspirations of its people, it is a democracy nonetheless which is significant when one looks at the situation in Syria or Libya. Iraqis are struggling to build a country which offers the possibility of working within the system to promote peaceful reforms, a deepening of democracy and the growth of economic opportunities.
However, it is not wise to be overly optimistic. To this date, Iraq remains a dangerous and unstable country, suffering the consequences of failed US policies, intrusions by neighboring states and ineffective public administration. After the “collapse,” as many still refer to the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi people stocked up on weapons and retrenched in their neighborhoods and communities. Some fought the United States. Many others fought one another, to settle old scores and to secure money and power in the new political order.
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In the predominantly Sunni towns of Ramadi and Falluja, people are now demanding an end to government discrimination.[/inset_left]
Regional powers also stepped into the fray, to support their favorite factions, as well as to derail US policy. Iran, in particular, eagerly seized the opportunity to teach a lesson to the United States, and force it to reconsider its revisionist designs for the region. Wealthy Iraqi exiles returned from abroad to run for office, while ruthless sectarian militias redefined the demographics of their districts with guns, bombs, and mortars. The broad fault lines of Iraqi politics became evident to all: there were Shi’a Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds. And those with political ambitions proved themselves ready to go to any length to appeal to the fears and frustrations of their base.
Today, the peaceful and increasingly prosperous Kurdish autonomous region coexists with the chaotic and unpredictable Arab-majority provinces. Indeed, generally high levels of security in Erbil and other Kurdish cities have allowed many private businesses to prosper, and the economy is growing rapidly, buttressed by Turkish investment and a real estate construction boom. In the Arab parts of Iraq on the other hand, militias, insurgent groups and criminal gangs remain active and many urban areas still feel like war zones.
While it is true that the security situation has improved significantly over the past three years, that improvement is relative to the state of full-blown civil war that consumed the country in 2006 and 2007. In those years, politically motivated violence resulted in an estimated 35,000 deaths per year. That figure is now down to 3,500 deaths per year, which is certainly much lower, but still high in absolute terms.
Moreover, the killings and the ethnic cleansing that took place in entire neighborhoods and districts all over Iraq have left the nation traumatized and fragmented. Ethno-sectarian chasms now separate Sunnis, Shi’as, and Kurds—in one of the most tragic expressions of democracy at work, the leaders of the various political parties have come to represent these divisions, playing on them to gain the support of their respective communities, while blaming the United States for the violence they contributed to incite.
The relationship between the government of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki and the Kurdistan Regional Government, headed by Massoud Barzani, remains fraught with behind-the-scenes rivalries over the negotiation of oil and gas contracts, as well as over the control of disputed areas, most prominently Kirkuk. Barzani recently warned that once the US troops leave a civil war between Arabs and Kurds could “explode at any time.”
Meanwhile, in the Sunni parts of the country, a slow but deadly insurgency continues to simmer. Armed groups frequently attack jewelry stores and other businesses to finance their activities, which include attacks on Shi’a civilians, as well as ambushes against government figures and the tribal sheiks associated with the Awakening Movement (a loose-knit Sunni coalition).
In Shi’a areas, splinters of the Mahdi Army have morphed into criminal gangs that prey on the civilian population. Moqtada Al-Sadr continues to struggle to rein in the rank-and-file members of his organization, and to remain relevant he has resorted to threatening to resume attacks on US troops if they fail to leave by the December 31 deadline.
The greatest problem facing Iraq today, however, may be the inefficiency of the central government. Despite its stratospheric oil revenues, the Maliki administration is still unable to provide many of the most basic public services. Corruption is endemic and evident to all. While most Iraqis must make do with two hours of electricity per day, government officials live in luxury, in houses that have gardens and pools. They earn fabulous salaries and preside over bloated state institutions rife with patronage and nepotism. Worst of all, they are more interested in clinging on to power than in tackling the problems that are at the root of Iraq’s civil strife—namely the misappropriation of Islam for political gain and the destabilizing influence of Iran.
Maliki frequently blames extremist groups for hampering public policy and slowing down the pace of reform. But, in fact, Maliki has also shown a tendency to exploit episodes of violence to control society and limit the rights and freedoms that are enshrined in the constitution. In the run-up to the 2010 parliamentary elections he personally intervened to exclude hundreds of Sunnis from running for public office, on the grounds that they once had ties to the Ba’ath Party.
In most cases, though, these purges targeted individuals who had held very low-level positions in the Ba’ath Party or who were simply suspected of having had informal links to Ba’ath officials. The charges appeared to be primarily political, aimed at keeping Maliki’s adversaries at bay and appealing to the sectarian prejudices of his constituents. Maliki has also proved to be hostile to any type of public gathering critical of his government.
Peaceful demonstrators—in Baghdad as well as in other cities, such as Ramadi, Falluja and Basra—have repeatedly been harassed by security forces and in some cases arrested and tortured. The recent murder of the journalist and democratic activist Hadi Al-Mahdi cast another dark shadow on the government, making the right to freedom of speech look increasingly tenuous and uncertain.
Al-Mahdi’s death, however, has reinvigorated the demonstrations, contributing to make the demands of pro-democracy activists more salient and visible. Popular movements that arose in February, on the heels of the Arab Spring, are now calling for more demonstrations, using social media like Facebook and Twitter, as well as blogs, like Iraqi Streets for Change and websites such as altahreernews.com.
In the predominantly Sunni towns of Ramadi and Falluja, people are now demanding an end to government discrimination. It is true that under Saddam all high-ranking government officials and all the military top brass were Sunni. But while it is fair and necessary to exclude from the government those individuals who were close to Saddam, it is wrong to punish the entire Sunni community. Such a policy breeds sectarian divisions and fuels the lower ranks of the insurgency.
Most insurgents, after all, are poor and disaffected individuals in their late teens or early twenties. They are typically unemployed and hate the government because they think it does not represent them. The only way to soothe the grievances of the Sunni minority is to draw a distinction between Saddam’s supporters and the general Sunni population. And this is exactly what many civil society movements are trying to achieve.
In the southern port of Basra, the people who take to the streets to protest against government corruption and inefficiency have another demand. They want to see the oil wealth coming from their province fund local development projects, particularly in communities that suffer from extraction-related pollution.
[inset_left]Students and academics are devising strategies to pressure their government, using social media to publicize open letters to Maliki[/inset_left]
Even in the Kurdish region the people of Iraq have taken to the streets with legitimate demands. The Kurds recognize that the two main regional parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, have monopolized power and do not tolerate any dissent. These two parties effectively control the Peshmerga (Kurdish armed forces) and are willing to use them against any individual or organization that threatens their authority. Smaller Kurdish parties, like Goran, have come repeatedly under attack. And on more than one occasion fighters have opened fire on protestors. Kurdish activists demand that the government be more transparent and accountable, and that political parties sever their ties to the Peshmerga.
In the University of Baghdad there is also a new democratic ferment. Students and academics are devising strategies to pressure their government, using social media to publicize open letters to Maliki and other members of the Council of Representatives. In the past few months, the government has responded to some of the requests of the Iraqi people, improving the electricity supply and removing some of the most corrupt officials from public office.
The fact that Iraq has a democratic framework means that its people can use democratic means to push the government to reform. It will be a difficult process, vulnerable to setbacks and subject to repression by the state security apparatus. But peaceful democratic reform is possible in Iraq.
Today, the only people that are still using violence to fight the government are those who hope to capitalize on the resurgence of a civil war. They are radicals, pursuing conflicting sectarian agendas, wishing to bring about intolerant and belligerent states. There are, however, millions of moderate Iraqis who are trying to build a strong state through peaceful and democratic means and they represent the best hope for national reconciliation, democracy and economic growth.
