Jordanian activists and Muslim Brotherhood leaders protest near the Israeli embassy after the death of a Jordanian lawyer who was killed by Israeli soldiers, on March 14, 2014. (Jordan Pix/Getty Images)[/caption]
As Friday prayers conclude outside the Al-Husseini mosque in downtown Amman, a small protest kicks off in the road. Men get up from their prayer mats—mainly improvised from flattened cardboard boxes—and begin to crowd around the nucleus of the event, where a Jordanian flag is being waved. Going about the crowd, some speak freely about the issues at stake and say it is a protest organized by the country’s Muslim Brotherhood; others just shrug and keep their distance. “I don’t know,” says one passerby as he crosses the road between honking cars that have slowed to a crawl, “perhaps it is the Ikhwan (“Brothers”). I am not part of it. They are a nuisance.”
The Brotherhood was not always considered such a nuisance. Having long operated as the key political opposition movement within the country, when Jordanians took to the streets in 2011 it looked set to continue its dominance. In alliance with an array of tribal and secular groups, the Brotherhood was firmly at the helm of protests, calling for economic and political reform and seemingly set on emulating the successes of Brotherhood chapters elsewhere in the region. But today, the group’s standing within Jordan is suffering. While it has so far managed to escape the suppression experienced in Egypt and avoided being branded a “terrorist” organization by the Jordanian government, the group is nevertheless still entering its own personal time of crisis, complete with falling levels of popular support, internal fragmentation and political isolation.
A mirror of its environment
Like any movement, Jordan’s Brotherhood is in part a product of its environment. Its internal dynamics closely mirror Jordanian society itself, where a split exists between Jordanians of Palestinian origin and East Bankers—those who originate from east of the River Jordan. Loyalty to the East Banker and Palestinian identities is strong. Ask an Ammani today where they are from, and in a bid to emphasize their identity the answer will tend to be a firm reference to a tribal area, an East Bank town outside Amman such as Karak or Ma’an, or the Palestinian birthplace of their grandparents. “People do not feel loyal to the state as Jordanians,” says Al-Sheikh, a Jordanian political analyst who has chosen to remain anonymous while discussing the Brotherhood in Jordan in the current climate. “Okay, at the football match against Uruguay last November, they were all waving their flags,” he continues. “But the day after, nobody cared.”
Tensions have always existed between the two groups, with many East Bankers traditionally supporting the monarchy while nursing frustrations at both the economic and political ramifications of the permanence of the Palestinian-origin majority. Not only are many concerned about being dragged into the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, but as Al-Sheikh explains, “since the economic crisis hit in the 1980s, the East Bankers—who have traditionally worked in the public sector—have enviously watched their Palestinian counterparts prosper in the urban private sector. So there is this dichotomy in Jordanian society where Jordanians do not do as well financially as Palestinians.”
Hawks and doves
Caught up within this wider identity crisis is the Brotherhood. Its ranks mirror societal splits, and the group is plagued by internal fragmentation. “This divide is something no one much likes to talk about,” comments Ibrahim Al-Gharaibeh, a Muslim Brotherhood expert at Jordan University’s Center for Strategic Studies. “It is a social dividing.”
In popular discourse, the Brotherhood and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), are said to be divided into two key segments. The ‘doves’—largely comprised of East-Banker Jordanians—are viewed as moderate, committed to domestic Jordanian issues, and willing to cooperate with the authorities. In contrast stand the ‘hawks’—generally Jordanians of Palestinian descent—who are more concerned with foreign policy (particularly as regards Israel–Palestine) and are generally viewed as rather more hardline and confrontational. With divergent priorities, the doves and hawks have at times come to blows. The doves, for instance, supported King Hussein’s decision in 1988 to sever ties with the West Bank and King Abdullah II’s decision in 1999 to expel the Hamas leadership—the hawks opposed these policies. Similarly, tensions arose in 2006 following hawkish Deputy General Guide Zaki Bani Irsheid’s support for Hamas-affiliated Palestinians in Gulf countries being allowed to join the Brotherhood’s Shura Council.
Following Hamas’s 2006 electoral success in Gaza, hawkish elements within the Brotherhood gained the upper hand. Two further incidents saw the Brotherhood lean closer towards Palestinian issues and away from its historically friendly relations with the monarchy: The first was the 2008 election of Hammam Saeed—known for his ties with Hamas—as leader of the Brotherhood. The other was the 2010 election of Ali Abu Al-Sukkar—a man who controversially attended the 2006 wake of the former head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi—as the IAF’s Shura Council president.
With Jordan’s neighboring states currently illustrating the dark side of dissent, many—both ordinary Jordanians and members of the Brotherhood—have shifted their support away from the movement, concerned about the Palestinian leadership’s intentions. No doubt strengthening these fears are Saeed’s close connections with Hamas and comments such as those made by Irsheid following Islamist president Mohamed Mursi’s ouster last year urging Egyptian military personnel to disobey their orders and form their own version of the Free Syrian Army to oppose Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi (although he later toned those comments down). “Nobody here wants to be like Egypt, and nobody here wants to be like Syria. Jordanians are very careful, and they are afraid that their country is going to be sucked into a vortex of chaos and instability,” comments Al-Sheikh.
The ‘Zamzam Initiative’
Set against fears of Jordan joining the wider chaos of the region, some of the Brotherhood’s more moderate members have split from the group. Following his departure, one such member, Rheil Gharaibeh, established the breakaway Zamzam Initiative—a broad-based movement whose platform calls for political, economic and social reform, as well as the development of an Islamist rhetoric that is compatible with democracy. “With many of its members [being] East-Bank Jordanians, one of its key aims is to bring focus back to Jordan itself and to act as a Jordanian movement,” explains Al-Sheikh. “It is not seeking to clash with the regime; it is seeking to work from within the current institutions.”
The Zamzam Initiative may not, as yet, have made much of an impact upon Jordan’s political landscape: “They talk—and it’s nice talk—but they show no evidence of action,” says Ibrahim Al-Gharaibeh. But as of April, it was estimated that the group had already attracted more than 500 members.
While the exodus of members is nothing new, within the current context of international Ikhwan weakness, defections such as that of Rheil Gharaibeh and the formation of splinter movements such as Zamzam have been rather unsettling for the movement. Officially launched in October 2013, at a time when the state-sponsored press was running a barrage of anti-Brotherhood articles, the timing of Zamzam’s arrival is seen by some as suspicious—perhaps even an attempt by the government to weaken the Brotherhood. “The government wanted to discredit the mainstream Brotherhood after what happened to Mursi in Egypt,” says Al-Sheikh. “I’m not saying that it is government-led, but I do think that the government has managed to manipulate the situation to present the group as a challenge to the main Brotherhood.” The Brotherhood has taken a tough stance on the new initiative. In late April, the organization issued a statement saying that “an internal tribunal has unanimously decided that this initiative violates the Brotherhood’s regulations and principles,” and that three prominent members, including Rheil Gharaibeh, had been dismissed for their involvement in the Zamzam Initiative.
The Brotherhood balancing act
With hawks at the helm of the Brotherhood’s leadership, the group is today facing a serious popularity problem. At a time when Jordanian society seeks the preservation of the imperfect system it knows rather than risk the chaos seen beyond its borders, more moderate political opposition is sought. While Zamzam may not be the answer many were hoping for—its inactivity and supposed links to the government undermine its credibility—it is a sign of growing frustrations within the Brotherhood itself. It is not just Jordanian society that is anxious about an increasingly hawkish trajectory.
But none of this implies the Brotherhood will be disappearing any time soon. Whether or not the government is behind the Zamzam Initiative, it is extremely unlikely it will ever push for a full-scale suppression of the Brotherhood such as that witnessed in Egypt. “The political system here needs the Brotherhood,” comments Ibrahim Al-Gharaibeh. “The monarchy doesn’t want to destroy it, but it doesn’t want it strong either. The two are like Siamese twins: The monarchy grants the Brotherhood space to operate, and the Brotherhood helps absorb Palestinian political sentiment, protecting the monarchy against the rise of more extremist organizations.”
For now, the Brotherhood remains an intrinsic part of Jordan—albeit weak and fragmented, complex and elusive. It may be affected by the Ikhwan’s wider fall from grace currently unfolding across the Middle East, but through its specifically Jordanian attributes it retains an individuality that allows it to function. Jordan’s Brotherhood mirrors a society trapped between internal tensions and the repercussions of the Arab Spring, and represents an increasingly relevant chapter of the international Brotherhood story.
