Libya’s Cyrenaican Crisis

Libya’s Cyrenaican Crisis

[caption id="attachment_55249270" align="alignnone" width="620"]The Brega refinery and oil terminal is pictured at night on March 11, 2014. Militia loyal to the Tripoli authorities were advancing on eastern Libya, where rebel fighters of the Cyrenaica Defence Force, demanding regional autonomy,  have begun exporting oil in defiance of the central government. (ABDULLAH DOMA/AFP/Getty Images) Libya's Brega refinery and oil terminal is pictured at night on March 11, 2014. (ABDULLAH DOMA/AFP/Getty Images)[/caption]

Prime Minister Ali Zeidan’s ouster earlier this month came as no surprise to anyone following Libyan politics closely. Although calls for his resignation began almost as soon as he took office in November, rumors of his dismissal by the General National Congress (GNC) had been circulating furiously in recent months, largely because his administration was unable to stem the violence that terrorizes post-Gaddafi Libya.

After all, assassinations and car bombings by Islamists have become an almost-daily feature of the Libyan news. But it was Zeidan’s inability to regain control over several oil ports in eastern Libya held by rebel militias campaigning for an autonomous government for Cyrenaica that prompted the GNC to pass a motion of no confidence in Zeidan earlier this month.

The precipitating event occurred when three hijackers who follow the leader of the Cyrenaican federalist movement, Ibrahim Jathran, succeeded in maneuvering a North Korea-flagged oil tanker loaded with oil from a key rebel-held port past the Libyan Navy. Since serving as a militia leader during the 2011 revolution, Jathran has become a powerful force in the eastern region of Libya. He was responsible for blocking almost half of the country’s oil production last October, grossly undermining the central government in Tripoli. He has since become one of the most visible figures of eastern Libya’s federalist movement, which calls for the reformation of the three provinces—Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan—Libya was divided into at independence in 1951. Those three regions were once self-governing bodies.

Under Gaddafi, government was heavily centralized, and Libyans in the east often felt marginalized. And, because Benghazi was a center of anti-Gaddafi activity, its citizens often bore the brunt of the regime’s use of force to quash dissent. This has led to lingering resentment of centralized power. Today, supporters of the federalist movement complain that Benghazi and other eastern cities have suffered from neglect and under-development. Many streets are unpaved, civic buildings are falling apart, and public services remain almost non-existent. Simple administrative tasks have to be undertaken far away in Tripoli. Over time, these problems have contributed to an overall diminished quality of life.

Oil, of course, remains at the center of this debate. The federalist movement also calls for a more equitable distribution of oil revenues between Tripoli and the regions, and its followers say that under the current system, most of the oil profits go directly to Tripoli. There is a perception that the east has been deprived of the profits of the oil it produces. This is primarily why the federalist movement has focused its efforts on the oil ports. Blockading the terminals is not only a strategic move, but a symbolic one for people in the east.

Still, many in the east do not support Jathran or the federalist movement, and he has been criticized for his use of force. But in the absence of a functioning central government, Jathran, his militia and the Cyrenaican Council have occupied a role that Zeidan and the GNC failed to fill. Benghazi has been a hotbed of violence, and Libyans in the east are anxious for any semblance of security. Jathran also has the upper hand when it comes to charisma and tenacity: Zeidan made an admirable effort at leadership, but he simply lacked the kind of galvanizing tendencies that make Jathran so compelling and effective.

A federalist government is perhaps a sensible option for Libya, where regional divisions have been thrown into sharp relief post-revolution. The fear, however, is that the combative nature of the federalist movement will undermine democratic efforts and force a partition.

All views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The Majalla magazine.

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