Yemenis hold an anti-government demonstration in Sana'a, the capital, on February 11, 2014. (Photo by Mohammed Hamoud/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)[/caption]On February 10, 2014, it was announced that the Regions Committee had recommended that the Republic of Yemen become a six-region federal state. The proposal would be included in the new constitution and then voted upon. The committee proposed that various provinces be grouped together to form regions, four in the North and two in the South. In addition, the two major cities, Sana’a and Aden, would gain special status and their municipal boundaries would be significantly expanded.
Importantly, more power would be devolved and decentralized, although the military would remain under federal control in their seven military districts. This would give regions more say over local issues, and in theory reduce the chance of a return to dictatorship. On the other hand, the Houthis and other groups suspicious of their Northern neighbor suggest it would also weaken Yemen to the benefit of Saudi Arabia.
Predictably, the complaints started almost immediately. Indeed, the Houthis declined to sign off on the Committee’s proposal. Some Southerners—such as the Yemeni Socialist Party—went along with the division (doubtless heartened by the opportunity to adjust the boundaries after an electoral cycle, possibly à la South Sudan). Others—notably the secessionists such as former Vice President Ali Salim Al-Beidh—decried it utterly, demanding independence or nothing.
On the face of it, some of the divisions make some sense: Hadhramaut region would include the eponymous Hadhramaut, Shabwa, Al-Mahra and the new island province of Socotra, while Janad would cover Taiz and Ibb. Aden region would comprise Aden city (enlarged and given semi-autonomous status) and the provinces of Abyan, Lahij and Dhala’ (ironically, most of the old West Aden Protectorate of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi’s youth). These groupings clearly reflect not only the rough boundaries of Yemen’s cultural identities, but also population density.
Other groupings are less obvious (although they reflect the existing governorates): Tihama Region will encompass Hudaidah, Rayma, Al-Mahwit and Hajjah provinces, grouping together the arid coast with the rain-fed foothills. Similarly, Saba will comprise the upland Al-Bayda province with the desert Marib and Al-Jawf. Most controversially, Azal would group Sana’a province (although not the city) with Dhamar, Amran and Saada provinces. While this region does comprise most of the historically Zaydi area, it is also the main focus of the antagonistic Hashid and Bakil tribal confederations and has been the seat of major conflict between the regime and the Houthis for most of the past decade—and tribal memories are long.
Officially, the Houthis’ complaint is that Azal is impoverished—bereft of natural resources and with no access to the sea. By contrast, they claim, “Saada has stronger cultural, social and geographical links with [coastal] Hajja and Jawf.” Creating a region of those areas would, however, give the Houthis a potentially autonomous statelet, with access to the sea, the Saudi border at their backs and the oil frontier of Al-Jawf under their control. That is not something the central government could countenance, any more than it was prepared to see a simple North–South two-region federation with its inherent potential for division.
So what—apart from the more obvious politics—are the issues that lie ahead of the federal plan? Is the idea viable, as was the case for the semi-autonomous tribal confederations under the Zaydi Imamate that lasted for centuries until 1962? Or is the idea so flawed as to be stillborn, as the 1994 Document of Pledge and Accord was?
The first issue is the creation of a fourth layer of politicians (local, provincial, national and now regional), and the physical and administrative infrastructure needed to support them. There may also be attempts to raise additional regional emergency and security services. Where will the money be found to establish and maintain these in an impoverished country?
Second is the issue of water, not only the construction and maintenance of new facilities, but also the need to support the new regional capitals. It is often predicted that Sana’a will be the first capital city to run out of water, while Taiz is also under major water stress.
Then there are the usual resource issues—will oil, gas, fisheries and so on be equably shared. or off-set for various reasons? Or will one area try to control the resources that lie in its geography—as with the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq?
Perhaps most importantly, there is the political issue—what will be the relationships between the different levels of administration? How will the regional politicians be chosen and who will pay for their elections? Will the four Northern regions be able to dominate the two Southern ones?
Many of these issues have still to be thought through, since it is clear that the main aim of the federalization was to address the Houthi and Southern political problems, with no time to flesh out the details. However, it will be just these details that will be the key to making federalization a success.
All views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The Majalla magazine.
