Bedouin protesters raise Al-Qaeda-affiliated flags on a watch tower in Egypt's Sinai on September 14, 2012 after they stormed a compound of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) to protest against a film mocking Islam, sparking clashes that left three people injured, a security official said. AFP PHOTO/STR [/caption]
Away in eastern Egypt, close to the desert border with Israel, there is a simmering regional time bomb which refuses to go away. With all the attention currently focused on the nation’s constitutional travails, the issue of Islamic militancy in the North Sinai has crept away into the side wings.
The second round of the constitutional referendum will take place tomorrow, and will likely enough confirm the predicted endorsement of Egypt’s national charter--much to the delight of the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies. The opposition is not lying down, and there will be political battles ahead. But across the Suez Canal east of Cairo, the desert wilderness bordering Israel and the Gaza Strip presents a headache which will inevitably produce more dangerous flare-ups in the future.
A senior Western diplomat based in Egypt recently outlined some of the main issues to Egypt Unwrapped. He claimed that despite the military’s public shows of action--such as the much-vaunted “crackdown” on Sinai Islamists following the summer killing of 16 soldiers at a border post--Egypt’s generals are in reality highly reluctant to tackle the issue.
There are numerous reasons for this, he said--but all of them are so inter-connected that any simple remedy is hard to come by. Analysts estimate that there may be up to 1,500 jihadis operating in the towns, villages and the desolate mountains of North Sinai. But as Mohamed Morsi must know, it is not simply a case of sending in some tank regiments and then mopping up the mess.
For one thing, given how deeply embedded the radical Islamists are, it would not look very good on TV. One Cairo-based Western official said it would amount to the Egyptian government waging war on its own people.
There are other thorns to negotiate. Launching an all-out assault would open up the can of worms involving all of the interlocking interests in the Sinai. Many of the region’s Bedouin Arabs, who suffered terrible oppression and decades of under-development at the hands of the former regime, have now found a common cause with fundamentalist groups in the area.
Part of the phenomenon is purely ideological. The Sinai, with its isolated mountains and relative lack of influence from central government, has for some time been a hideaway of radical fugitives. Their separatist message appeals to many young Bedouin who feel cast out by the Egyptian state.
But much of the complication comes about due to economic ties. Ever since Israel launched its blockade of Gaza, the Bedouin have controlled the hundreds of tunnels used to smuggle arms and products into the enclave.
Originally simply a lucrative job opportunity in the absence of other alternatives, the trade has now entangled the operators and their dependents with the fate of a number of other actors. These include Hamas, other Gazan factions and the several hundred Egyptian jihadis believed to be in the area. Launching a military offensive without tackling the root causes of the jihadi-Bedouin relationship will therefore simply not cut it.
The government of Mohamed Morsi seems to have acknowledged the need for a new approach. The president has already made two high-profile visits to the North Sinai, and has also called for foreign investment in the region. But the militants still remain, as do the illicit trade networks which bind Sinai’s Bedouin to armed factions in Gaza.The current predicament has been many years in the making. It will require a similar length of time to put it right.
