The Pope, the Shia, and Iran

Insights on the Papal Visit to Iraq and its Effect on Lebanon

In this photograph provided by Vatican Media, Pope Francis meets with Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Al-Husayni Al-Sistani on March 06, 2021 in Najaf, Iraq. (Getty)
In this photograph provided by Vatican Media, Pope Francis meets with Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Al-Husayni Al-Sistani on March 06, 2021 in Najaf, Iraq. (Getty)

The Pope, the Shia, and Iran

Many have reported and commented on the significance of Pope Francis’ visit to Iraq, mainly when Iran and the region is going through many shifts and conflicts. Although the whole visit was important to everyone in the region, his meeting with Najaf’s Ayatollah’s Ali Sistani seems to have gained more attention than the Pope’s other stops and meetings.

This visit came one month after Pope Francis and Sheikh Ahmad al-Tayyeb, the imam of the Al-Azhar celebrated the one year anniversary of signing the “fraternity” document during an event that took place in Abu Dhabi. With the backing of the United Arab Emirates, the initiative has gone on to create a high-level commission to spread the message and plans are under way to build in Abu Dhabi a center with a synagogue, mosque and church in a tangible display of interfaith coexistence and sharing.

Now the Pope goes to Najaf and recognizes it the weight of the Arab Shia, and acknowledges Sistani as the representative of moderate Shiism. Although the Pope didn’t mention Tehran or Qum even once, his message was very clear: Najaf is the only Shia center the moderate world will deal with.

Iran Should Be Worried

The Iranian regime was obviously unhappy but incapable of criticizing the Pope’s choices. At the end of the day, there is no larger Christian figure, especially for the Middle East Christians. On the international public opinion level, questioning the Pope’s choices would be met with serious pushback. Accordingly, the Iranian regime was stuck and paralyzed, despite its frustration.

However, their complicated relation with Najaf and Sistani per se, might get more complicated after the visit and when the political translation of the meting takes shape. The differences between the two Shia references are many, rooted in history but also influences religious and political principles. Recently, political differences started to increase and escalate, mainly when Najaf criticized Iran’s roles in Iraq at the expense of Iraq’s state institutions.

Despite all the attempts made by the Iranian regime to tame or control Najaf and its rhetoric, Najaf remained independent and in fact, because of this independence, its influence grew among the Iraqi Shia. This was very apparent during the protests that broke out in 2019 – which not only received Najaf’s support, but also carried very strong anti-Iran sentiments. Accordingly, the statement that followed the Pope-Sistani meeting – highlighting clear political messages about core regional issues that Iran wants to hijack, such as the Palestinian issue – has probably upset the Iranian regime more than the rest of the visit and other statements coming from Iraq during that weekend.

For the past forty years, Iran has spent the majority of its energy and resources to claim the Shia representation in the Arab world and beyond. And when they finally declared the four Arab capitals – Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, and Sanaa – under Iran’s control, it didn’t take much for these four capitals to collapse under Iran’s weaponry and killing machines. And after all this effort and sacrifice at home, Najaf get the main recognition, and from the Pope himself.

Repercussions in Lebanon

It is clear that the Pope’s Iraq visit was not limited to Iraq. On his way back to the Vatican, Pope Francis stated that his next visit will be to Lebanon, another country of interest to Iran. That would not be the first visit of the Pope to Lebanon, but it will be the first after the collapse of the state institutions and the financial system in Lebanon. It would be the first after Lebanon fell under Iran’s hegemony and Hezbollah’s control.

Therefore, his intention to visit Lebanon at this point gains a political dimension as well. But the context is much more interesting and timely. Not long ago, Lebanon’s Patriarch Bechara al-Rahi – and probably in coordination with the Vatican and the French President Emmanuel Macron – called for a new initiative where the Lebanese crisis is “internationalized,” meaning that it becomes the responsibility of the international community.

During his famous speech earlier this month, the Patriarch called for on Lebanon’s “neutrality” and the independence of the state and local parties from any regional influence or interference. “Failure to respect neutrality is the sole cause of all the crises and wars that the country has gone through,” he said, pointing to the full disarmament of all non-state factions, including Hezbollah.

This fits perfectly alongside the messages that emerged from the Pope-Sistani meeting in Najaf, and it has angered Hezbollah the same way the Najaf meeting angered Iran. However, the Patriarch’s message has a sharper message to Hezbollah, as many Christians are looking for a way outside the representation of the current president Michel Aoun and his son-in-law Gebran Bassil. For many Lebanese, the alliance between Aoun and Hezbollah, which was established with the Memorandum of understanding - signed in February 2006 – has only led to the devastation and collapse of Lebanon and its state institutions.   

When the Patriarch launched his initiative, many Christians expressed support. The choice has become very simple: internationalizing Lebanon and moving forward, or stay under Iran’s hegemony and starve to death, literally. Aoun no longer represents the Christian street, according to a number of statistics and polling coming out of Lebanon. And when Aoun loses the Christian Street, Hezbollah loses its Christian cover. And when the Patriarch wins the Christian street, Hezbollah loses the Christian cover. And when the Pope meets Sistani in the heart of Najaf, Iran can no longer claim that they have the support of the Middle Eastern Christians.

These developments; however, cannot be translated into pragmatic political strategies to contain Iran in the region unless the international community is actually interested in investing in a new rhetoric in the region, or in accepting the responsibility for Lebanon. But as much as the Shia Street in Iraq is closer to Najaf than it is to Qum, the Christian Street in Lebanon is closer to Bkerki than it is to Baabda – that is, the presidential palace. Hence, the international policies in Lebanon should take this into consideration while considering the future of the region, and the future of Iraq and Lebanon in particular.

It is very clear, for example, that a presidential resignation in Lebanon is now not only a must to move forward with change, but is also a popular demand. Aoun lost his legitimacy as both the president of the Lebanese people and as the Maronite representative. Accordingly, his son-in-law Bassil can no longer be allowed to seek the presidency as his natural right. Both need to be more isolated and eventually be held accountable.

Between the Pope and the Patriarch, the region told Iran that there will be no surrender without a fight. The world should listen.

 

Hanin Ghaddar is the Friedmann Fellow at The Washington Institute’s Geduld Program on Arab Politics, where she focuses on Shia politics throughout the Levant.

font change