Houthi tribesmen walk near a Yemeni soldier in Amran on April 10, 2014 as they gather for a rally against the death of five people that were killed in fighting between Houthis and government forces the previous day. (Gamal Noman/AFP/Getty Images)[/caption]
Fighting in Yemen between the Houthis, a Zaydi Shi'a rebel group, and tribal and Sunni Islamist militias has come within miles of Sana'a in recent weeks, sparking fears that the Houthis plan on continuing its march south to the capital.
But how likely is it that the group, for six years the underdogs in a stop–start civil war with the government of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, would take such a huge step? Not very. But that does not mean that fighting won’t soon come to Sana'a.
Since early 2014, the Houthis—who have become one of Yemen’s most effective fighting forces over the past decade—have been making rapid gains in Amran, the province that separates Saada, the Houthi heartland, from Sana'a. On July 8 they seized Amran city, just 30 miles (50 kilometers) north of Sana'a, killing a prominent military officer who had allegedly been backing the tribal and Islamist forces they had been fighting.
On July 13, the group quit the city in exchange for a promise from Yemen’s president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, that he would sack a regional military commander, replacing him with an officer more to the Houthis’ taste. It was an ignominious climb down for the president and the coalition of forces the Houthis had been fighting with.
In taking Amran city, the group completed a rout of tribal and Sunni Islamist militias loyal to the Al Ahmar family, the leaders of the country’s most powerful tribal confederation, and Al-Islah, Yemen’s main Sunni Islamist party in which the Al Ahmars play a prominent role. They also forced out the 310th Armoured Brigade, a military unit widely viewed as being under the control of Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar (no relation to the Al Ahmar family), a leading military officer with alleged conservative Islamist leanings. Hamid Al-Qushaibi, the unit’s commander who was killed, had been fighting with the Houthis in Amran despite entreaties from Hadi to stay out of the conflict.
Media outlets with ties to the Al Ahmars, Islah and Mohsen have been pressuring Hadi to launch an all-out war against the group, claiming that the Houthis intend to continue south with the aim of reinstating the Zaydi Imamate that ruled over north Yemen for a millennium up to 1962. The Houthis deny this, claiming instead that they are helping local tribal groups force out “extremists” and accusing the Al Ahmars, Islah and Ali Mohsen of working in coordination with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the local franchise of the extremist movement, which Washington views as being among the world’s deadliest.
The support of the local tribes is an important issue when considering the Houthis as a fighting force, particularly when discussing their motivation and ability to move further south. According to several people with knowledge of recent events in Amran, the Houthis make up a small fraction of the fighters involved in the conflict. They have leveraged local grievances against the Al Ahmars and Islah, along with the historical Zaydi identity of many groups in the region to build a patchwork of alliances, utilizing the locals’ knowledge of the area and their own tactical nous to stage successive victories in Amran and elsewhere. The attack on Amran city allegedly involved just a few dozen or so Houthi fighters and hundreds of locals seeking revenge against the heavy-handed tactics of Qushaibi and his men. Houthi officials point to the coalition the group has built as evidence that the fighting is not sectarian in nature, meanwhile using the argument to refute claims that they wish to reinstate the Imamate.
If the Houthis were to continue southwards to Sana'a it is unlikely that the tribes would support them in the same way, although a number of Houthi officials claim proudly that Sana'a is a stronghold for the group and has been exporting fighters on the side of the Houthis to Amran, rather than the other way around. Similarly, the Houthis do not seem to be keen to take over the responsibility of governing outside Saada. Taking the capital would stretch a resource-light group beyond its limits.
Rather, the fight is likely to continue in other parts of Yemen, particularly Al-Jawf, to the east of Saada and Amran, where the Houthis are caught up in a struggle for influence with the Al Ahmars and Islamist militias, and in Arhab, an area in northern Sana'a province that borders the capital and is widely seen as a stronghold for Sunni Islamists. If they gain control of these areas, the group will control several key access routes to Sana’a, heightening their influence, and will have staged an impressive victory over the tribal and Islamist forces, possibly permanently adjusting the balance of power in Yemen.
But just because the Houthis do not want to take the fight to Sana'a does not mean that violence is unlikely to break out there. Over the past several years, assassinations and attacks on areas of Sana'a seen as being controlled by the Houthis have come close to provoking the group into open retaliation. AQAP has announced the formation of a new unit tasked with fighting the Houthis, meanwhile, and would not be averse to launching an attack in Sana'a. Hadi is also under pressure to take the group on, and security officials could launch an assault on the group in the capital in order to force his hand. Equally, a rogue leader from within the Houthi movement—which, as the International Crisis Group argues in a major new report on the Houthis—is by no means a monolithic mass, could well decide that the capital is a legitimate target.
Hadi, meanwhile, finds himself trying to broker a truce between groups that are crucial to the success of the political transition he has been presiding over. If Islah, the Houthis, or both, decide to quit the process and settle scores on the ground, the process will stall, if not fail irrevocably.
All views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The Majalla magazine.
