Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters light up flares during a demonstration against the military-backed government on September 10, 2013 in Cairo, Egypt. (Mahmoud Khaled/AFP/Getty Images)[/caption]
When Egypt’s uprising began in January 2011, many observers warned that the ouster of Hosni Mubarak and the relative stability he had offered would give way to an Iranian-style theocracy in Cairo that would threaten the security of the Middle East. While an Egyptian Iran was unlikely, an Egypt under the rule of political Islam did seem inevitable, as the Muslim Brotherhood and a variety of Salafist groups rose to prominence. When the first parliamentary elections, which ran from late 2011 to early 2012, returned both houses of parliament dominated by Islamists, the predicted triumph of political Islam seemed to have been realized.
After those elections, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to rise up out of Mubarak’s shadow. Under Mubarak, the Brotherhood was the declared enemy of the government, but they were also co-opted into the political scene. While this contributed to sustaining Mubarak’s authoritarian leadership, it also weakened it by providing a discourse of opposition that seemed to offer a potentially powerful alternative to Mubarak’s regime. It was this that enabled Islamists to emerge after the uprising in Egypt as the assumed representatives of the people and as the most entrenched opposition network, which was primed and ready to step into the gap left by Mubarak’s government.
Consequently, many were surprised by the seemingly rapid downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood and its president, Mohamed Mursi, after June 30, 2013. However, this should not have been totally unexpected. Almost as soon as the Muslim Brotherhood moved in to become the most influential political bloc after February 2011, their decline also began. Anecdotal evidence suggests that disillusionment had set in from the start of the establishment of a Muslim Brotherhood-dominated lower house in early 2012. It was viewed as being preoccupied with trivial matters and with pushing through an Islamist agenda as a higher priority than addressing the domestic, social and economic challenges exposed by the 2011 uprising.
After June 30, the apparent triumph of political Islam in Egypt turned into tragedy as the tables were turned once again. This time, the Egyptian people came out into the streets in their millions to call on the army and the transitional government to return Muslim Brotherhood leaders to prison and remove political Islam from the scene.
This does not mean that the Muslim Brotherhood never had broad support. Under Mubarak, there was very little political space for opponents. Had Mubarak allowed a multiparty system to evolve, political Islam would not have gained as much support. The turn to political Islam has often been an expression of a lack of alternatives and the failure of other ideologies.
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928, at a time when Egypt was dealing with a post-Ottoman region and seeking independence from the British. Both of these aspirations required a new identity for the social and political system. But political Islam really rose to prominence in the 1970s, emerging from the humiliation of the 1967 war with Israel and the apparent failure of Arab socialism and pan-Arabism. The well-known scholar of Islam, Olivier Roy, later claimed that Islamism has also failed because, like Arab nationalism, it has been unable to unite Arab publics or to have any real impact on regional policy. For him, the endurance of the nation-state has prevented Islamism from having any real transnational impact.
Events in Egypt seem to agree with this argument. Support for the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood despite criticism and previous fears about the intentions of the army suggest that the Brotherhood’s value was in its provision of an umbrella for the opposition and for welfare networks but that their politicized Islam was less appealing to the public. Once they were perceived to have failed to look after Egypt’s best interests, their ideology fell from favor.
The uprisings were collectively called an ‘Arab Spring,’ but each was rooted in its own national context with its specific demands and challenges. As a result, transnational ideologies and aspirations, such as Islamism or Arabism, would become secondary concerns, and to survive, Islamists would need to adapt their agenda. In Egypt, at least, they were judged unable to do so.
The new hegemonic discourse of Egyptian politics is nation-state sovereignty and the protection of the nation from the terrorism perpetrated by religious extremists. The Muslim Brotherhood has come to symbolize a threat to the nation and the security of its borders, which is unacceptable according to the present political current.
The short term future of the Muslim Brotherhood is bleak, especially after an Egyptian court banned the organization’s activities early last week. It is not necessarily a final failure though. If the transition to democracy fails or there is a return to a Mubarak-like regime dominated by the military, political Islam might rise to the fore again as an opposition discourse. The Muslim Brotherhood are familiar with that position—and they do well in it.
All views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The Majalla Magazine.
