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In conversation with eminent Chinese scholars, Professor Li Weijian and Professor Ye Qing, The Majalla discusses China, the Middle East and the Arab World Transformation.
[caption id="attachment_55227254" align="alignleft" width="112" caption="Professor Li Weijian "]
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[caption id="attachment_55227255" align="alignright" width="112" caption="Professor Ye Qing"]
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Prof. Li Weijian is currently Director and Senior Fellow of the Department of West Asian and African Studies at Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS).He is also Standing Council Member of the China Association for Middle East Studies. Prof. Li’s research interests focus on Middle East politics, energy, culture and China-Middle East relations.
Prof. Ye Qing is Deputy Director of the Institute of Global Governance and Director of the Center of International Organization and International Law at SIIS. Prof. Ye specializes in China’s diplomacy, emerging powers and international systems in transition, Middle East studies and Islamism.
The Majalla: In what ways has the Arab Spring affected Beijing's diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa?
Prof. Li Weijian. First of all, let me clarify that we in China do not use the term Arab Spring to describe what's going on in the Middle East. To my personal understanding, spring indicates hope and prosperity but we still have not seen any concrete outcome emerging out of the recent upheavals, so I prefer the term transformation.And this transformation has just begun in its early stage and can be divided into two parts: the first part was the emergence of democratic/popular movements that led to the overthrow of the older regimes. The second part, which is much more important, is about the path which Arab societies choose and how they seek to build their future. This is what I mean when I say the transformation has just begun and the problem here is that Arab societies and elites seem to have no clear idea about the future of their countries and this lack of vision is something that concerns China.
[inset_left]We firmly believe that any instability in Syria and its immediate neighbourhood caused by military intervention will have very dangerous repercussions that could destabilise the entire Middle East.
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With regard to your question – that is, Arab Spring's influence on China's Middle East policy – these events have not greatly affected our policies because Arab Spring was not about China and its policies in the region, and also because China's reach and interests in the Middle East and North Africa are much more limited in comparison to the West. So looking into the future, one can be certain that China's fundamental foreign policy principles will not change and we will in no way try to shape/influence political events in the region. Instead, China will seek to establish and maintain good relations with all the regional actors and will strive to promote peace and prosperity in the MENA by adhering to its principles of non-interference and respect for national sovereignty of other states. This is clearly evident in China's stance on Libya and Syria where we were and still are against the use of force.
Having said this, however, one ought to bear in mind that there are now new regimes emerging in the region, and there is a great deal of uncertainty about their future outlooks. In this sense, China's Middle East policy will undergo some minor changes to reflect realities on the ground and to enable Beijing to establish friendly ties with the new regimes. Overall though, as I mentioned earlier, our foreign policy principles will not change and that we will respect the choice of the Arab people and will work with their newly elected representatives so to continue our traditional friendship.
Prof. Ye Qing. I agree with Prof. Li Weijian. The only point that I would add is that China's engagement with the Middle East is indeed limited. First of all, China remains a developing country. Secondly, the major emphasis of China's diplomacy for the near future will be on its periphery and Asia Pacific. Hence China is unprepared to fully engage with the Middle East at this point in time. But China did learn some lessons from the upheavals especially with regard to risk management and ensuring security for Chinese businesses in the region. Simultaneously, we will closely watch the events as they unfold and try to understand the political realities of the region.
Q: What was the nature of China-Tunisia relations during the Ben Ali era? Also, what are Beijing's interests in "new Tunis" and how does it perceive the recent election there?
Prof. Li Weijian. Tunisia is a minor player in the overall geopolitical scheme of the MENA and that it has never occupied an important place in China's regional policy compared to the Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, and Turkey.
With regard to recent elections, suffice to say that it was only a natural outcome after the fall of Ben Ali regime in the hands of a democratic movement and that China did not assign any significance to this election. What really matters is how the new government is going to rule although Beijing will respect and support the Tunisian public choice.
Q: What about Egypt? What are your thoughts on political developments in Cairo, especially with regard to the future role of the Army in the Egyptian politics as well as the emerging Turkish-Egyptian tie and how this could influence regional developments?
Prof. Li Weijian. The Egyptian military is a product of history with Egyptian Presidents in recent history all rising to power from the ranks of the armed forces – i.e. Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. This, in conjuncture with its mediating role during the anti-Mubarak protests, indicates that Egyptian army will only continue to play a defining role in the Egyptian polity and society in the years ahead. At the same time, the United States government gives billions of dollars in aid to the army and that Washington has established close ties to the military. In this way, Washington has traditionally exerted considerable influence over the Egyptian army and in fact it is no exaggeration to say that US does control, albeit not entirely, the Egyptian armed forces. This, I think, is another factor that helps one to understand the importance and the continuity of the military role in Egypt.
In relations to the emerging Turkish-Egyptian ties and its implications for the international relations of the Middle East and North Africa, one thing that is undisputable is that Turkey is seeking to become the dominant power in the region and in fact a large proportion of the Arab public welcomes this today. As a result, the emerging ties between Turkey and Egypt should be seen in this context.
Nevertheless, Turkey's power has limits. One force of constraint on the rising Turkish influence will be Egypt because Egypt itself is an ambitious regional power. Egypt is currently weak but Cairo will be suspicious of rising Turkish power in the Arab world in the long run and will therefore try to impose limits on the scope of Ankara's influence in regional affairs. Meanwhile, there is an ongoing and fierce debate inside Turkey about the future direction of Turkey's foreign policy. On the one hand, there are those who favour a more rapid expansion of ties with the Middle East. On the other, many prefer to retain and strengthen Ankara's European identity. This divided opinion forms another obstacle to Turkey's rise to dominance in the MENA. Finally, Turkish foreign policy has traditionally been based on engagement with the West. As a result, she lacks experience and expertise in dealing with the Middle East; a fact that was clearly manifested in Ankara's "zero problem with neighbours" doctrine which has created many problems for Turkey over the last few years. All these, in turn, suggest that Turkish hegemony or leadership cannot be taken as granted, and thus I am of the opinion that there will emerge a pluralistic regional order in the future with Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey as the key players.
Prof. Ye Qing. Egyptian Army will remain a key player in Egypt but it will be a behind a scene force. There are reports that Egyptian army are in control of 40 percent to 60 percent of the economy and that what really matters to the army is to maintain its economic monopoly not to get involved in politics; at least not publically. So I assume that elections in Egypt will eventually take place and the army transfers power to the elected civilian government. Nonetheless, generals will continue to play a key role in Egypt in the foreseeable future.
As for the Turkish-Egyptian ties, I share the same view with Prof. Li Weijian. With a strong domestic support base and in command of a healthy and growing economy, Turkish government has its own regional ambitions and today there is a wider space for it to increase its power and influence in the region, especially that all other regional players are weak. But Turkey is a medium power and that its power is limited in scope. Beside those factors that Prof. Li Weijian. mentioned, Turkey's Ottoman past is still very much alive in the Arab public consciousness and hence I do not think the current Arab goodwill towards Turkey is a perpetual one; it is only a honeymoon that will end as new regimes gradually come into power and establish a degree of stability over their respective societies.
Q: Moving to Libya is the future of Libya as a democratic country certain or are we going to witness more instability in post-Qadhafi Libya?
Prof. Li Weijian. There are both similarities and differences between what is happening in Libya and other Arab states. The shared or common factor is that people and politicians, similar to their counterparts in Egypt, Syria, and Yemen, do not have a clear vision for the future of their country and there still has not emerged a clear line of leadership. This illustrates the political immaturity of Libya's civil society as well as polity.
What has been different in Libya, on the other hand, is the unparalleled degree of chaos and destruction which is mainly due to the fact that transition of power from the Qadhafi regime to the NTC was not natural. It was rather achieved by outside intervention and the use of force and thus today's instability throughout Libya as well as the inhumane treatment of the Libyan dictator should not be surprising to observers. Looking into the future though, I happen to believe that future will be better for Libya with more social, political, and economic freedoms to be enjoyed by ordinary Libyans.
Q: There are now talks of Obama doctrine in the realm of foreign policy; that is, an extensive use of technology in warfare, smart use of military might like the establishment of no fly zones, covert missions, and a back role for the US as opposed to a leading role. Do you think such strategy would bear fruits in other theatres like Syria? Could you also briefly explain China's interests in Syria?
Prof. Li Weijina. China's interest in Syria has a broad regional context and that is Beijing's desire to maintain and preserver regional peace and order in the Middle East. A replication of West's Libya strategy in Syria will only lead to more chaos, instability, and insecurity in this geopolitically important part of the world. This is why China vetoed the UN Security Council Resolution on Syria. We firmly believe that any instability in Syria and its immediate neighbourhood caused by military intervention will have very dangerous repercussions that could destabilise the entire Middle East.
Regarding the so called Obama doctrine and the strategy that is now being associated with it, I have to say that I personally do not think this is a new strategy, let alone doctrine, for which US has consciously planned for. In my view, given US economic troubles at home combined with certain lessons that it has learnt from its experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama Administration had no other option but to give up its leadership role and try to reduce its war casualties and the cost of its military operations abroad through an extensive and smart use of technology in order to be able to avoid domestic criticisms.
Now if you are asking me that whether establishment of a no fly zone over Syria can have a positive outcome, my answer is no. Syria is not Libya and as I mentioned earlier any kind of military intervention there would only lead to more instability. More importantly, a no fly zone has to be approved and authorised by the UN and I do not think that Washington will be able to get enough vote for such endeavour unless US and its allies are prepared to undertake a unilateral action which is highly unlikely.
Q: China has been building hospitals and schools in Yemen so I assume Beijing has a clear understanding of the Yemeni politics. How important is Yemen in China's political orbit? Do you think China is willing to play a mediating role there?
Prof. Li Weijian. Although China and Yemen have traditionally had good relations, Yemen today is just another ordinary Middle Eastern country for China. So I do not think Beijing is prepared to play a mediating role in Yemen. For us, this is a domestic affair that Yemenis themselves have to resolve. I hope to see an end to the current clashes between the government and anti-government forces soon so there can be a resumption of normal relations between Beijing and Sana.
Prof. Ye Qing. I would just like to add a point with regard to the history of Sino-Yemeni relations. Before 1979, China's foreign policy was more ideologically oriented and that Beijing had enjoyed good political relations with Yemen. Since 1979 when China started to adopt reform and open-up policy and the subsequent prominence of trade/commerce diplomacy in China, however, Yemen's importance in China's Middle East diplomacy has declined.
Q: There is an assumption amongst certain Western analysts that with the emergence of more representative governments in the MENA, US influence and standing will decline. I would like to know if, in your opinion, China is prepared to share some of the financial burdens of maintaining security in the Middle East should Washington loosen its commitment to the security of Arab states?
Prof. Li Weijian. In principle, firstly, China has always said that it is keen to contribute to and play a role in the preservation of peace and security in the Middle East in accordance to its international power and prestige. Now that China's global power is rising, I personally think Beijing should pay more attention to the Middle East and North Africa region.
Secondly, from China's perspective the
On a more abstract level though, I believe that China's willingness to promote peace and security should be discussed and analysed on a case by case bases because security is a broad term that could include various fields, while every single country has its own distinct security needs and concerns. So if we take the example of peace-keeping, China already has the largest number of peacekeepers amongst the P5 in the Security Council. China has also engaged in peace-keeping operations in the Middle East
Prof. Ye Qing. I don't think US is ready to see an increased Chinese military presence in the region. It is crystal clear to us that our contribution will only cause tension in our bilateral ties with the US. In other words, Washington will not be happy to see a strong Chinese presence in the Middle East even though the strategic importance of MENA is declining in the US with Washington being more occupied with domestic economic problems, future of Afghanistan, and its shift of attention to the Asia Pacific.
