Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) greets US President Barack Obama during an official welcome of G20 heads of state and government, heads of invited states and international organizations at the G20 summit on September 5, 2013, in St. Petersburg, Russia. (Alexey Kudenko/Host Photo Agency via Getty Images)[/caption]
The unfolding scenes of street protests, violence and demonstrations in Independence Square in Kiev and the subsequent flight of Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych from his state residence at the end of February captured attention all over the world, even in places rocked by all-out war. Tweets from activists in Syria optimistically linked their own struggle to that of Yanukovych’s opponents, while Ukrainian bloggers tried to tie their “revolutionary” struggle to the Arab uprisings. Images of the Ukrainian president’s lavish mansion and private zoo were shared side by side on Twitter, Facebook and Instagram with images of the decadence of some of the opulent palaces belonging Muammar Gaddafi and Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali. Looking at the AP and Reuters photos emerging from Ukraine, one could find nearly identical photos of youth in the Arab world fighting back tear gas and snipers.
Many media outlets in Europe and the United States, such as the BBC, Fox News and CNN, covered the unfolding crisis in Ukraine along the same lines as they have covered the events occurring across the Arab world since 2011. These networks knew that their viewers, predominantly middle-aged, remember the events of 1989 and the fall of communism in Europe, and that they would be glued to their television screens watching one of the final acts of the Cold War. One could easily have mistaken Anderson Cooper’s arrival in Kiev with his arrival in Cairo at the height of the 2011 uprisings.
Unlike in Syria, where commentators have sought to portray the Russian and American tensions over Bashar Al-Assad’s actions as tangential to relations between the two former Cold War rivals, the events in the Ukraine—including the movement of Russian forces to seize control of Crimea—proved an even better and more dramatic setting for speculation about the eruption of a new Cold War. One commentator even sought to tie Saddam Hussein and the Iraq War of 2003 to the Ukraine crisis, when he confidently proclaimed on Twitter that Putin was worse than Saddam Hussein.
America’s political class will not let the media and those on Twitter alone have the spotlight, and have sought to link all of the United States’ tensions with Russia to the crisis in the Ukraine. Senator John McCain, never shy to rattle the old Cold War saber, and his colleague, Lindsey Graham, were among the first to appear on the television news networks condemning President Putin and his various actions around the world. Sarah Palin, who once famously declared that she could “see Russia from her front porch,” used the unfolding events in Ukraine as an opportunity to size up President Obama’s global leadership based on the fashion preferences of the American president and his Russian counterpart. Palin’s conclusion aligned with the broader conclusion members of the Republican Party were drawing on President Obama: that he lacks the gumption and toughness of his Russian counterpart, whether it be on Ukraine or Syria. American leadership, in their view, was weak and directionless in the face of Putin’s brass-knuckled realpolitik.
President Obama and his national security team initially responded to the unfolding events in Ukraine with a degree of caution. As the protests unfolded, Obama refused to wholeheartedly embrace the events going on as President Bush did back in 2004, and instead cautiously welcomed the overthrow of Yanukovych while remaining skeptical about the leaders emerging from the opposition. President Obama and his Secretary of State, John Kerry, sought in their calls to their counterparts in Moscow to urge the Russian leadership not to interfere militarily as events unfolded in Ukraine, but instead to support the American and European effort to find a political solution. Overall, Obama and his European counterparts were seeking to avoid another Georgia-type situation where Russia redraws the boundaries of one of its neighbors.
President Putin’s rebuff of the European and American approach, as well as the rapid mobilization and deployment of Russian forces—both regular forces and Russian-organized unofficial paramilitaries—to seize control of the Crimean peninsula, where the headquarters of Russia’s Black Sea fleet is based, was a stern rebuke to Obama’s attempt to keep Moscow on board with his diplomatic efforts. Washington responded to Moscow’s actions by refusing to attend the upcoming G8 meeting in Sochi, suspending trade talks, threatening a number of Congressionally sponsored economic sanctions, and imposing sanctions, travel bans and asset freezes on specific Russian leaders. At the same time, the United States began to review its military support for its allies bordering Russia and bolstering its military commitments to NATO.
While arguably the Ukrainian crisis has a number of immediate implications—both in terms of Russia’s economic and political relations with the EU and the US strategic posture in Europe—it’s direct implications for other areas of US–Russian relations are important as well. The knock-on effect of this standoff on the Ukraine has important implications on common areas of strategic interest between the United States and Russia, including Iran and Syria.
Resets and red lines
Despite Russia’s declining geostrategic influence beyond its neighborhood, Russia and the United States have fallen on opposite sides of a number of key global strategic issues. As a number of senior Russian and American officials acknowledge, Washington and Moscow have fundamentally divergent interests on many key issues, and the opportunities to bridge those differences are often absent, or the differences are exacerbated by these states’ domestic politics and their leaders’ personal dislike and distrust of one another. This doesn’t preclude cooperation, as evidenced by a degree of Russo–American intelligence cooperation on counterterrorism issues, financial reform, Afghanistan, joint support for an Iranian nuclear agreement, and the search for a settlement to the Syrian conflict.
However, on a purely bilateral level, Russo–American relations have worsened during President Putin’s new term and President Obama’s time in office, despite initial attempts when President Obama entered office to “reset” relations. From human rights to Edward Snowden to adoption cases, Washington and Moscow have clashed, and these issues have become more acrimonious due to domestic support within both states for hardline policies. While President Putin is known for his own personal distaste for US foreign policy, when Mitt Romney ran for office in 2012, he repeatedly emphasized that Russia is the United States’ most substantial geopolitical “foe.” President Obama’s most recent Ambassador to Moscow, Michael McFaul, was a known critic of President Putin’s policies before he was even nominated to the position, and the Kremlin reacted to his appointment with displeasure.
As a result, any attempts at a “reset” were usually foiled by domestic politics and seeming lack of interest by either Obama or Putin to move beyond limited cooperation on common strategic interests. While President Obama has succeeded in carving out a reputation different than that of President Bush, at the end of the day, as Russian officials note, Obama’s reputation is no better.
A cold but cooperative status quo arguably characterized their relations going into 2013. As much as Putin and Obama disagree on many aspects of the crisis in Syria, they were able to reach an agreement on Syria’s chemical weapons program last August and have both supported a diplomatic process to end Syria’s war. This willingness to work together on common interests, even if there are still differences, allowed the admittedly cold Russo–American relationship to be productive in some cases.
The recent breakdown of the Ukrainian state has upended this relationship’s workable status quo and has pushed it to a breaking point following differences over a Russian “red line”—the security of its vulnerable western front. The domestic reaction to the crisis in both states has made it more difficult for either leader to find a workable compromise and instead has so far driven both leaders towards fundamentally irreconcilable positions.
Obama could end up spoiling his ability to cooperate with Moscow on a whole range of strategic issues for the remainder of his term if his administration and Congress push forward with or introduce new sanctions legislation against Russia. A settlement of the crisis in Ukraine is vital, then, to his wider foreign policy goals. If Obama is unwilling to accommodate Russia’s “red line” on Ukraine and find a solution with Moscow, it will be very difficult to expect Russia to respect American “red lines.”
A Crimean entente for a Geneva settlement
A diplomatic settlement of the Syrian conflict hangs in the balance of the turbulent politics of Ukraine. The failure of the United States and Russia to reach a settlement on Ukraine will further convince Putin that Obama is not a partner he can work with, and the resulting sanctions, if imposed, will make him even more interested in foiling American efforts in Syria.
The Geneva process rests on Russia’s participation and cooperation not only in delivering the Syrian government to the table, but also in keeping it committed to the process. While Moscow’s influence in Syria is often greatly exaggerated, Russia has played a critical role as both an interlocutor with the Syrian government and as a state that has a degree of influence on Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, as Moscow has provided him with critical international diplomatic cover.
Even though no progress has been made in the talks so far—as evidenced by the most recent rounds of talks—Geneva II was the first time that representatives from different sides have met face to face since the start of the conflict. It is arguably only in this kind of format that a solution to Syria’s war can be reached, and it will take a number of rounds of negotiations to move closer to a settlement. Both opposition and regime officials have acknowledged that a purely military solution to Syria’s war is not obtainable.
While President Obama has acknowledged that the talks have stalled and that new options may be needed to add pressure on President Assad to negotiate, the objective of getting the two sides coming together to agree to a political settlement remains at the core of his strategy. American officials have repeatedly emphasized that the United States alone cannot make this process work: Russian participation is essential.
President Obama will likely have to make a choice: preserving Ukraine’s full independence at the expense of Russia’s position, or securing a deal that accommodates Russia’s interests on Ukraine so that the two states can cooperate on Syria, among other important strategic issues.
The Obama administration has tried both options so far: confronting Russia on its position and, at the same time, seeking a settlement. John Kerry visited Kiev earlier this week and offered 1 billion US dollars in aid to the government in Kiev. At the same time, Kerry has met in Paris with the Russian foreign minister and their European counterparts to try to secure a deal on Ukraine. While this is a relatively safe position to take—adding pressure on Russia to try to strengthen American bargaining power at negotiations—it is relatively risky.
Putin is well aware that Obama is in no position to use, and has no interest in using, military force in Crimea. Even on economic sanctions, the Obama administration and the US Congress are further ahead of the European Union. At the end of the day, European governments are more interested in maintaining their energy and trade deals with Moscow than preserving the sovereignty of Crimea and eastern Ukraine.
One of the fundamental questions President Obama has yet to answer is what strategic interests are at stake for the United States if Russia remains in either direct or indirect control of Crimea. Beyond preserving the sovereignty and independence of another nation—a laudable principle—is such a stance worth compromising wider strategic cooperation on critical matters of national security?
A political solution on Syria is arguably more important to the national interests of the United States than a continued standoff with Russia over Ukraine, which has no real positive endpoint for Washington. Thus it is in the interest of the United States to reach a deal with Russia and not move forward with sanctions. Such a deal could put US–Russian cooperation back on track on Syria, and ideally would move the stalled Geneva process forwards.
A well-known axiom of Putin’s foreign policy is that he usually demands something in exchange for something else. In this case, President Obama could make concessions on Ukraine in exchange for a more amenable position from Russia on Syria. Such an entente on Crimea could arguably do more to reach a diplomatic solution on Syria than any other previous attempts by the Obama administration to sway Putin on the issue since the beginning of the conflict.
To take such action would require President Obama to not only be prepared to face some domestic criticism for making a deal with Russia, but also, more broadly, to think more strategically about the US’s wider global position and the long-term effects of crises, instead of viewing them predominantly in the short term.
