An Ending and a Beginning

An Ending and a Beginning

[caption id="attachment_55248451" align="alignnone" width="620"]TUNIS, TUNISIA - FEBRUARY 7: A ceremony at the National Constituent Assembly in Tunis, Tunisia, on February 7, 2014. Tunisia celebrates the adoption of a new constitution with a ceremony at the national assembly attended by several heads of state. (Photo by Amine Landoulsi/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images) Tunisia celebrates the adoption of a new constitution with a ceremony at the national assembly attended by several heads of state. (Amine Landoulsi/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)[/caption]Three years and six governments after Ben Ali's overthrow and the eruption of the Arab Spring, Tunisia has managed to avoid civil war, witnessed a peaceful transfer of power (three times), organized free elections, and passed what TIME magazine called “one of the most progressive constitutions in the Arab world.” On the other hand, the economy is not in great shape, the security situation is certainly the worst it has ever been, and terrorism has gained ground in the country.

Tunisia’s situation can perhaps be best summarized by its current political landscape: it has a functioning “schizophrenic constitution,” according to some experts in constitutional law, and an unelected technocratic government.

The ratification of Tunisia’s constitution was the finish line of a trip along a bumpy road marked by deep polarization between Ennahda and its allies on one side, and the opposition on another. The country witnessed a series of crises after the departure of Ben Ali in January 2011—although last year was the most unpleasant, involving assassinations, bombings, massive demonstrations and a faltering economy. Some analysts even predicted an “Egyptian Scenario.”

Yet the bloody summer in Egypt was a wake-up call for Ennahda. It seems, moreover, that an attempted coup was foiled in Tunisia during that period. The resurgence of the ancien régime was another point of concern to the ruling Troika, as was the increasingly discontented population. “Legitimacy” was no longer viable protection for them, and their promises were no longer taken at face value. Realism once again took over; compromise became the key word, the last dam before capitulation.

The opposition was also struggling: the anti-Troika union failed to last more than a few weeks, and the army was weak and overstretched. The police, segmented by Ben Ali in a “divide and conquer” strategy, remained a fragmented body. Remnants of the former ruling party were also divided and their strongest group, Nida Tounes (Tunisian Call), was cracking from inside while facing a rising foe from the same family, Al-Haraka Al-Dostouria (the Constitution Movement). Street protests were only witnessed during extreme events, and for a short period. The population was obviously tired of politics. Negotiation became the better option.

Mutual fear and the lack of trust created a vacuum, but it was filled by a quartet of civil society groups: the General Union of Tunisian Workers, the Tunisian Union for Industry, Commerce and Handicrafts, the Tunisian Human Rights League, and the Tunisian National Association of Lawyers. They encouraged all parties to sit down and negotiate under the banner of a National Dialogue, hence accelerating the drafting of the constitution. Setting deadlines and warnings, the quartet pushed Ennahda to resign, and when a consensus proved impossible, ignored the diverging opinions and appointed a prime minister. Ennahda and its opponents had to give up their strong positions inside the Constituent Assembly.

The attempt to appease everyone has led to a number of contradictory elements in the new constitution. Hence the first article, in which the country is said to have Islam as its religion while at the same time being a secular state, is added to the sixth article, guaranteeing “freedom of conscience, of faith and of worship,” while the state is expected to protect the sacred.

The chosen government is itself full of polarized figures. Some of the ministers held high positions under the Ben Ali regime: the Minister of Justice, for instance, and the delegate Minister for National Security. Others belong to apparatchik families, while some are known for their Troika connections—the new prime minister was himself part of Ennahda's government, while the Minister of the Interior has kept his post. So, even though many other ministers are independent technocrats, it seems obvious the coalition is in essence a compromise between Ennahda and the ancien régime.

However, it seems that constitutional harmony has mended the Islamist–Secularist divide in Tunisia, as well forging this union between Ennahda and the ancien régime. An air of peace is permeating the country. Radicals—from both sides—may be unhappy, but they are tacitly agreeing to the new order. The Constituent Assembly will become a parliament in the upcoming months. As for the so-called neutral government, it has many tasks ahead, most important among them bolstering the country’s security and its economy, and organizing the upcoming elections marking the official end of the transitional period.

All views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The Majalla magazine.
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