Libyan prime minister Ali Zeidan (L) and the head of the General National Congress, Nouri Bousahmein (R), give a press conference at the government headquarters in Tripoli on October 10, 2013, shortly after Zeidan was freed from the captivity of militiamen who had held him for several hours. (AFP PHOTO / STR)[/caption]In the weeks since the brief kidnapping of Libyan prime minister Ali Zeidan, many pundits have been carelessly talking about various nightmare scenarios that may befall Libya. Yet the fragmentation of the country into smaller states or the birth of a new strongman cast in the mold of Gaddafi seem unlikely, because Libya’s disparate militias are far too focused on their own local agendas. They lack the capacity to cooperate or to build a consensus for either of those outcomes, and they certainly lack the capability or inclination to create the institutions needed to govern. In short, Libya's militias and local councils are fragmented, and they will remain so. Even among those loosely termed federalists, who are the largest and most dynamic currents pushing for provincial autonomy, there is a new split among the leadership of the movement between the Council of Cyrenaica and the Political Bureau of Cyrenaica.
The kidnapping has revealed the true extent of the Zeidan government’s weakness. Speculation that he might have known in advance about the US raid that seized Al-Qaeda operative Abu Anas Al-Liby has only weakened him further. As a result, he is afraid to accept help and technical assistance from his Western allies, out of fear of being labeled a puppet.
Mohamed Sawan, the head of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Development Party, has called publicly for Zeidan to resign, while Zeidan has stuck to his pledge not to do so. This highlights the ongoing political feud between the Muslim Brotherhood and the more liberal-leaning Zeidan. This is mirrored by the split within the General National Congress (GNC) between the Brotherhood and Martyrs blocs on the one hand, and Zeidan's supporters, including the National Forces Alliance, on the other. However, despite this increasing polarization and Zeidan’s waning support, the GNC is unable to vote him out: they cannot agree on which person or coalition would replace him.
Now, the GNC and Zeidan’s cabinet are seek increased credibility so the Libyan people do not decide to abandon the democratic experiment altogether out of abject frustration. Therefore, the continuing gridlock in the GNC—as evident in the public walkout of ninety-four Members of Congress on October 27—cannot be beneficial. Members of Congress, including those in the National Forces Alliance who have often threatened to boycott GNC sessions, walked out as a reaction against GNC president Nuri Abu Sahmain, altering the previously agreed upon parliamentary agenda to avert discussion of an investigation into the LYD 900 million (USD 7,331,976) allocated by Abu Sahmain to the revolutionary brigades. This included the Operations Room of Libya’s Revolutionaries, which is accused of involvement in the kidnapping of the prime minister. Those GNC members who stayed in the session were largely from the Brotherhood's Justice and Construction Party and, hence, supporters of Abu Sahmain.
One of the government’s largest ongoing crises is the occupation of oil sites throughout the country, which is blocking the main source of government revenue. Ibrahim Jathran, leader of the Political Bureau of Cyrenaica and a former commander of the Petroleum Facilities Guard that is meant to protect oil and gas installations, declared a federal state in Cyrenaica on October 24 with its own prime minister and Council of Ministers. The new “Prime Minister of Cyrenaica,” Abdraba Abdulhameed Al-Barasi, said that this move was meant to provide self-governance for Cyrenaica within Libya, and was not an attempt to secede.
Ahmad Zubair Al-Senussi, head of the original Cyrenaican Transitional Council that declared Cyrenaica a federal entity in March 2012, later announced to the press that the Council of Cyrenaica and the Political Bureau of Cyrenaica are separate (i.e. competitive) entities despite mostly shared goals. The definite split between the two groups shows that the leadership of the most significant opposition political movement to the GNC is desperately divided.
In the middle of political grievances dominating the attention of national and local leaders, corruption and outright theft is allowed to flourish. Critics of the nation’s leaders are quick to point out their incompetence and corruption, while the outright thuggery of some armed brigades passes without much public scrutiny—possibly because the GNC has no means to censure its practitioners.
As armed protestors have occupied oilfield sites throughout Libya to draw attention to their demands, distribution of money (i.e. bribes) is being practiced. Through these payouts, the GNC hopes it can placate the protesters and magically make their demands go away. Oversight to ensure that the millions of Libyan dinar disbursed to brigades or protest groups would be spent on the intended security purposes, or to benefit the local communities is, of course, lacking. Without such oversight, the payoffs are mere appeasement and are likely to promote a spiral of further demands. In some cases, funds are quietly siphoned off into personal accounts, while in others they are stolen at gunpoint, such as the October 28 theft of approximately USD 55 million belonging to the Central Bank of Libya from a van in Sirte.
To speak of Libya as a state possessing a government governing its territory is to grossly misunderstand the reality on the ground—but to think that the current government of Ali Zeidan is likely to be replaced by bands of Islamists militiamen or federalist local and provincial councils is even more preposterous.
All views expressed in this blog post are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The Majalla magazine.
