Iranian demonstrators hold up portraits of the Islamic republic's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and wave placards with the trademark slogan "Down with the USA" during a protest after the Friday noon prayer in Tehran on May 18, 2012 (ATTA KENARE/AFP/GettyImages)[/caption]History was made on September 27 when the presidents of the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani, spoke on the phone for the first time in three decades. A day earlier, John Kerry, the US Secretary of State and his Iranian counterpart Javad Zarif had sat next to one another at the same table to discuss Iran’s controversial nuclear program with the group known as the P5+1. Later the same day, the two men even held a private conversation signaling to the world that it was perhaps time for a thaw in a relationship that has been characterized by thirty-four years of intense cold.
Considering Iran’s power structure, such an important conversation could not have taken place unless Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had granted the Iranian team his blessing. Rouhani and Zarif are seasoned politicians who are not interested in facing the Supreme Leader’s wrath upon returning home. Then why have so many Iranian hardliners with close ties to Khamenei unleashed a barrage of fire against Rouhani and his team for talking to the US? The answer goes back to the identity of the Islamic Republic and its core supporters, whose support Khamenei does not dare jeopardize.
The Iranian regime has defined itself, especially to its domestic foot soldiers, as the standard-bearer of anti-Americanism in the world. Ayatollah Khamenei, the man at the top of Iran’s political pyramid, fears the consequences on his own grip on power should he openly and publicly endorse a rapprochement with the United States.
Khamenei is walking a fine line in Iran. On the one hand, the regime he leads has become more and more isolated in the past eight years due to its inflammatory rhetoric and its unwillingness to negotiate in good faith about its controversial nuclear program. This global isolation has on the other hand led to an unprecedented sanctions regime levied against Iran. These sanctions have had catastrophic effects on the Iranian economy and have made the regime less confident of its stability in case of a domestic uprising or a foreign military strike. Khamenei gave Rouhani and his team the green light to reach out to the West after international sanctions brought the economy to a grinding halt, and domestic pressure manifested in the election of a semi-moderate forced the hardliners to go back to the negotiating table.
Continuing on the same path of antagonizing the West is not an option for Khamenei. Nor is opening up to the United States and alienating his own domestic diehards. Khamenei has tactically allowed Rouhani and his team of moderate technocrats to test the waters by reaching out to the West and the US. If their efforts succeed in lifting some or all the sanctions, Khamenei would happily take some or all the credit as the genius “Leader” behind the “heroic flexibility” plan. But if Rouhani fails, Khamenei, who has positioned himself in a position of maximum deniability, will be able to save face, and once again tell his supporters that the West—and the US in particular—cannot be trusted.
Khamenei is not after normalizing relations with the United States—at least not now and at least not without domestic pressure of biblical proportions. He is not interested in the grand reopening of the US Embassy in Tehran nor is he eager to see thousands of Iranians line up at the gates of the embassy every day to apply for visas to leave the country he has so mercilessly taken from them.
Khamenei’s plan, to implicitly support Rouhani while explicitly condemn any concessions made to the West or exchanges with the US, may very well provide him with the safety raft he needs to weather the current storm—at least for now. After all, leaders, even religious despots like Khamenei, cannot speak out of both sides of their mouths forever.
All views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The Majalla magazine.
