An Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural painted on the wall of the former US embassy in Tehran.(ATTA KENARE/AFP/Getty Images)[/caption]Few could have predicted the extraordinary chain of events that led President Obama to support a Russian-sponsored diplomatic initiative which will for the foreseeable future shield Syria, a Russian ally, from US military action. At best, Obama has avoided having to stake his credibility on Congress supporting an ill-advised military action that the president was out-maneuvered into advocating. At worst, he has simply kicked the issue down the road and must now put his faith in a diplomatic framework that will ultimately be defined by President Putin—an individual Obama fundamentally does not trust. Even the best-case scenario—Assad verifiably destroying his stockpile of chemical weapons—will not significantly alleviate the terrible suffering in Syria. America cannot play a positive role in stabilizing the civil war, and even if it could, that settlement would not amount to a major foreign policy victory for an administration desperately seeking a legacy.
Given the calamitous state of Obama’s Middle East policy, why do many US–Iran watchers believe that conditions are increasingly ripe for an imminent break-through in one of the most fundamentally broken and dysfunctional relationships on the international stage?
The first rule of fixing a major foreign policy disaster is to repackage what comes after as a much wider victory. Faced with America’s humiliating withdrawal from Vietnam, Nixon managed with some success to present détente as the phoenix that rose out of the ashes of this disaster. The world was safer, he argued, because Washington had sought Moscow and Beijing’s cooperation in achieving a graceful exit from Vietnam.
Iran also has a record of radically transforming its foreign relations after it reached its lowest ebb. While Iran would never characterize the war inflicted upon it by Iraq in the 1980s as anything other than an unprovoked aggression, it eventually recognized that nearly all its neighbors supported Iraq was, in some way, a failure of its radical foreign policies. During the 1990s, the Hashemi Rafsanjani Administration embarked on a policy of regional engagement that was broadly successful in improving its security and prosperity.
Once again, America and Iran have found themselves chastened and desperately in need of an era-defining foreign policy success. A major break-through in relations with post-revolutionary Iran, an achievement that has eluded all his predecessors, has the potential to single-handedly secure Obama’s foreign policy legacy. The benefits of a US–Iranian reconciliation stretch from improving the global economy to facilitating Obama’s desire to pay more strategic attention to the Far East. A settlement on the nuclear issue would prevent the doomsday scenario of a military confrontation and help dilute regional suspicions that are part of the reason why Syria has become both a tragic civil war and proxy conflict for regional actors.
[inset_left]Once again, America and Iran have found themselves chastened and desperately in need of an era-defining foreign policy success[/inset_left]
Proceeding from the view that Iran’s severe economic problems are primarily a foreign policy problem, the Rouhani Administration represents the best partner Washington can realistically hope for. Washington and Tehran both appear to share the view that the situation in Syria, rather than being an obstacle to constructive engagement, may actually represent an important starting point for dialogue. This is partly because—aside from the obvious fact that Iran remains committed to the Assad regime and denies that the Syrian government has used chemical weapons—the two countries share some core concerns. Last month, I wrote that the Obama Administration appeared to be communicating its plans to intervene in Syria with Iran, probably in the hope that it could protect upcoming talks with Iran’s nuclear negotiators. The US wanted Iran to restrain Syria from launching further chemical attacks. It also needed to be sure that Iran would itself not retaliate. It is not difficult to see how Obama could have been reassured on both fronts. Iran is repulsed by chemical warfare and has no interest in a US military escalation. Furthermore, both sides wish to prevent Sunni jihadist groups from becoming the dominant power in Syria.
Whether the two countries could have managed the fall-out from any US strike is a moot point, at least for the moment, but those shared interests remain in place. In fact, those who wish to permanently rule out a US military intervention in Syria (a group that includes the US, China, Russia, and Iran) are more desperate than ever to avoid further chemical attacks in Syria. It is significant, therefore, that Obama praised Iran’s role in pushing Assad to exclude their further use in four recent TV interviews. Washington and Tehran have exchanged at least two letters discussing ways in which they can prevent the Syrian conflict from threatening their core interests. According to Iranian reports, Obama went further—expressing his hope to “turn a new page” in relations and even offering up the chances of significant sanctions relief if Iran responds to basic concerns regarding its nuclear program. Obama publicly invited Iran to participate in the Geneva II talks that hope (probably forlornly) to negotiate at least a ceasefire in Syria. Of course, Obama had to balance this gesture by restating his commitment to using military force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, but this will be correctly read in Tehran as empty words designed to paper over criticism that his Syria policy has emboldened Iran.
The narrative that Iran has been emboldened by America’s retreat from military action in Syria is demonstrably false. The response in Iran was immediately positive. Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif quickly came out in support of the Russian plan. The diplomacy that has spun out of Obama’s mishandling of Syria has only encouraged the more constructive posture Rouhani has assumed on the nuclear issue. On the back of Obama’s letter to Tehran, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announced on September 13 that Iran had reduced its stock of 20 percent enriched uranium by 40 percent by converting it to fuel rods for a medical research reactor. Declaring that Iran was “ready to relieve the other side’s concerns,” Saleh signaled that the rest of the stockpile was being converted as well. Rouhani followed this up by stating his intention to use his first speech to the UN General Assembly, scheduled for September 24, to arrange meetings with the members of the P5+1—the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany—in order to get nuclear negotiations back on track. Completing the encouraging news on the nuclear front was the confirmation that responsibility for the nuclear file had been taken from the Supreme National Security Council, headed by the implacable Saeed Jalili, and handed to the Foreign Ministry.
Rouhani has boldly moved to prevent hardline elements from undermining his attempt to steer Iran towards a more moderate path. In a very public escalation of a series of spats with the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) over Syria, nuclear talks and domestic issues, Rouhani warned the Guards’ leadership to “stay out of political games” and satisfy themselves with their prominent role in the economy.
It goes without saying that Rouhani will have to convince Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that his foreign policy adjustment will not compromise the values, legitimacy or security of the Islamic Republic (as defined by Khamenei). We should not underestimate the challenge this presents, but current signs indicate that Khamenei is continuing to give his president the benefit of the doubt. It can be reasonably deduced that the lack of any negative reaction in the hardline press to Jalili’s dismissal follows guidance from the Supreme Leader’s office. This supposition was reinforced when the Iranian Students’ News Agency carried extracts from a speech by Khamenei the day after Rouhani issued his challenge to the IRGC in which he expressed his qualified support for diplomacy. Completing the list of encouraging news was the announcement that eleven political prisoners had been released, including prominent lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh.
[inset_right]A chastened America represents a more appealing negotiating partner for Iran. [/inset_right]
All of this augurs well for progress on the diplomatic front. On the US side, the debate on Syria confirms that the American public is overwhelmingly resistant to another military intervention in the Middle East. Even Congress, which has spent the last decade churning out anti-Iranian resolutions, was unmoved by Obama’s argument (emphatically supported by AIPAC and other pro-Israeli lobby groups) that inaction in Syria would embolden Iran. It would be foolish to believe that Congress has become dovish on the Iranian nuclear program, but the ends to which they will go to uphold the credibility of military threats against Iran may be far more limited than many expected. Doubtless, Israeli president Benjamin Netanyahu will use his UN speech to once again bang the war drum, but few seriously believe that the Obama Administration has any appetite for attacking Iran.
A chastened America represents a more appealing negotiating partner for Iran. Historically, when one side advances an initiative from a position of strength, the other has been wary of appearing weak or giving away too much. Iran tried and failed to engage the Bush Administration in 2003, when it was at the height of its ideological hubris. Iran appeared similarly unreachable when it was perceived to be riding the crest of a Shi’a revival following the collapse of American authority in Iraq and Hezbollah’s resistance to Israeli attacks in 2006. Iran now finds itself facing the most severe sanctions ever levied against a single state. Obama, bruised in Syria and unable to move the Israelis towards a settlement with the Palestinians, desperately needs a major foreign policy success. Rouhani needs progress on sanctions relief in order to sustain and even extend the license Khamenei appears to have given him to pursue more moderate policies. The Arab Spring has been a scoreless draw. It represents neither an Iran-inspired Islamic awakening nor a regional yearning for Western-style democracy.
While Rouhani’s predecessor treated his annual trip to New York as an opportunity to preserve Iran’s pariah status, the new Iranian president wants meaningful dialogue. The fact that a potential Obama–Rouhani meeting at the UN was suggested as a semi-serious possibility (later denied by the White House) is evidence enough that we are firmly in the post-Ahmadinejad era. It has been reported that Rouhani will, however, discuss with British foreign secretary William Hague the possibility of restoring relations suspended after an Iranian mob ransacked the UK embassy in Tehran. Long-suffering observers of Iran’s troubled relations with the West have become accustomed to seeing apparently promising developments collapse in the wake of external shocks or domestic resistance. This time, all sides will have to reach deeper inside the jaws of victory in order to clutch defeat—but don’t rule it out just yet.
