A Thin Red Line

A Thin Red Line

[caption id="attachment_55245048" align="aligncenter" width="620"]In this handout image provided by the U.S. Navy, The USS Barry launches a Tomahawk missile in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn March 19, 2011 (Jonathan Sunderman/U.S. Navy via Getty Images) In this handout image provided by the U.S. Navy, The USS Barry launches a Tomahawk missile in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn March 19, 2011 (Jonathan Sunderman/U.S. Navy via Getty Images)[/caption]Shortly before his death, George F. Kennan, one of the leading voices in American foreign relations during the 20th century, issued a prophetic warning on the eve of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. “Anyone who has ever studied the history of American diplomacy, especially military diplomacy, knows that you might start in a war with certain things on your mind as a purpose of what you are doing, but in the end, you found yourself fighting for entirely different things that you had never thought of before," he said.

"In other words, war has a momentum of its own and it carries you away from all thoughtful intentions when you get into it. Today, if we went into Iraq, like the president would like us to do, you know where you begin. You never know where you are going to end,” he warned.

Kennan’s words capture the fundamental dilemma of the impending military strike against President Assad’s regime in Syria: as morally unconscionable President Assad’s alleged use of chemical weapons against his own people is, will President Obama know where this campaign will end or will it take on a life of its own?

A short offshore campaign of launching Tomahawk cruise missiles from naval vessels deployed in the Mediterranean is presently being finalized by the United States and its international coalition of 35 plus nations. With only 50 military sites—including military units which apparently involved in launching the chemical weapons—under consideration for the initial round of strikes, it’s unclear to what extent this operation will dismantle the command and control structure of Assad’s military and security forces. President Obama has chosen to not try to destroy the chemical weapons stockpiles, out of fear of that such action could make it easier for groups to get hold of the loose chemical weapons that aren’t destroyed by the bombing.

The White House hopes to prevent a scenario where this international military effort leads to a power vacuum in Syria, potentially dragging the US into another “nation-building” exercise at the expense of its domestic commitments. Obama has repeatedly emphasized during his first and second term in office that he wants an end to the decade of war in the Middle East, and his reluctance to do anything substantial in Syria has aligned with this.

Despite Senator John McCain’s clamoring for “regime change,” only 9% of the American public supports a military intervention in Syria, according to a recent Reuters/IPSOS poll. Such low public support further supports President Obama’s own reluctance to employ military force in Syria.

President Obama’s decision to sign the United States up for a limited operation leaves the US and its international coalition with a thin margin of error to constrain President Assad’s forces and military capabilities.

General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned in his testimony to Congress last month that any US military action in Syria to neutralize President Assad’s chemical weapons capabilities would require a sustained air and naval campaign, with the possible deployment of US ground forces. He estimated that the costs of such an operation would be over USD 1 billion a month. The plan currently being considered is more austere and doesn’t involve a single air sortie. According to Dempsey’s criteria from last month, the current plan wouldn’t pass muster.

Tomahawk cruise missiles have also been criticized as a poor substitute for an aerial bombing campaign. One cruise missile has less than a third of the explosive power of one 1,000 pound bomb dropped from a warplane. In addition, these missiles are not capable of striking mobile units and are too weak to destroy underground installations.

These initials attacks, even if they even destroy their targets, are largely symbolic. They will not alter the situation on the ground that substantially. President Assad’s successes on the battlefield have more to do with his employment of paramilitary militias, Hezbollah fighters, and his capitalization on his opponent’s own weaknesses. These strikes will disappoint members of the Syrian opposition who hoped that the United States would militarily neutralize President Assad’s capabilities.

President Obama and his international partners move forward, then, on a rather uncertain road. There is hope that these attacks will lead President Assad to refrain from using chemical weapons again, but the cruel irony is that he has unleashed as much horror against his civilian population with conventional weapons, which so far have not moved the US to take any significant action. It’s also likely that President Assad planned for a potential response, and relocated valuable military assets and the vital parts of his command and control structure away from sites likely to be targeted.

President Assad will likely then come away from these initial strikes with a different message. Not only has he survived President Bush’s Iraq War and almost two and half years of conflict, he will have survived an international military campaign against him. He will use this as a symbolic victory to rally his base, and will flout any demand to constrain his military objectives. It is not inconceivable that he will use chemical weapons again to show that he can breach President Obama’s red line and survive.

This leaves the United States and its international partners not so far from where they started. Furious about this violation of Syria’s sovereignty, Putin will likely use this action as further ammunition to foil US actions in Syria. Any military action also sets back any opportunity for a “Geneva II” peace conference, because this military action will make the Assad regime even less interested in participating in a deal brokered by the United States.

Having employed merely a symbolic deterrent, President Obama will possibly confront a new chemical weapons attack in the coming months. At that point, will President Obama be forced to take more extensive military action? This limited military action could then transform into a sustained, costly military campaign in Syria, involving troops on the ground. As Kennan warned, “You now where you begin. You never know where you are going to end.”
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