United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon (L) attends a meeting with Yemeni President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi in Sana’a on 19 November 2012. Source: MOHAMMED HUWAIS/AFP/Getty Images[/caption]
Crying wolf was an activity in which Ali Abdullah Saleh excelled. For years, Yemen’s former president explored regional and international worries about the presence of Al-Qaeda, while seldom honoring a pact of non-aggression with the organization’s regional leadership. Time and again, his government made allegations about the connections between Houthi rebels in north-west Yemen and Iran, but consistently failed to provide evidence of such links. This strategy allowed Saleh to secure various forms of aid from Western and Gulf states, disguise a dismal government record grounded on an entrenched patronage system, and obtain a free pass to crackdown on internal dissenters.
Instability has been a characteristic of Yemen since unification in 1990; yet at present, the current state of crisis is more of a reality check than an asset for Saleh’s successors in the Yemeni transitional government. Whilst they struggle to oversee a peaceful transition and deal with the burden of Saleh’s legacy, the international media—always eager for the next eye-catching news peg—has turned its attention elsewhere. With a never-ending war in Syria, instability spilling into neighboring Lebanon, serious tensions between Palestinians and Israelis, and a clumsy and autocratic Muslim Brotherhood government threatening to undo Egypt’s fragile transition, regional and international players are forced to view Yemen’s predicaments in perspective.
Therefore, the impasse in Yemen’s National Dialogue—still undeserving of that name—has gone largely unnoticed. Initially planned to begin in November this year, its start date keeps being pushed back. At stake is no less than what various Yemeni political figures refer to as the futureof Yemen as a “civil state,” the drafting of a new constitution, and the February 2014 presidential elections. The outcome will dictate the path towards unity and peace or division and war for this already fractured nation.
Regardless of the adjournments, recent developments bring hope of at least gathering the representatives of the diverse players at the negotiating table. Despite accusations of favoritism towards his family and tribe—very much in Saleh’s mould—Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, Yemen’s acting president and former vice-president, can be credited with sincere efforts to bring northerners and southerners together to talk. The good news is that two days ago the preparatory committee handed its final report to President Hadi, who is expected to announce a date for the start of the National Dialogue any time now.
Part of the credit for this development goes to the UN. Two UN Security Council resolutions have declared support for the “territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Yemen.” Ban Ki-Moon visited Sana’a in late November to express support for the current government. The UN secretary general threatened to use sanctions against any Yemeni player that attempts to undermine the National Dialogue process. This was a message not only to the leaders of the southern movement known as Al-Harak, but also to Saleh, who still looms over Yemeni politics. Saleh remains the leader of his party, the General People’s Congress, which comprises half of the members of the current government. He enjoys of great influence among army ranks, especially the powerful Yemeni Republican Guard. There are many rumors that he is promoting his son, Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, to the leadership of the party so that Ahmed can run for president in 2014.
Based in Sana’a, Jamal Bin Omar, the UN’s Yemen envoy, undertook an intense round of diplomatic talks over the last month that led him to New York, a number of Gulf capitals, and Cairo, where he met with some leaders of Al-Harak. As Mohammed Jumeh, a Yemeni journalist for Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper told The Majalla, “In Cairo, Bin Omar conveyed the message to Al-Harak’s leadership that all issues can be discussed in the National Dialogue.” Nevertheless, Bin Omar left the clear message that no pre-conditions (for example, the talk of independence) would be accepted before negotiations start. In response, most of the southern leaders have given assurances that their factions will be represented at the talks.
Other players have also made their positions public. The Houthis, marginalized politically during Saleh’s era, have confirmed they will join in negotiations, most likely in expectation of having a say in any future arrangement. The Revolutionary Youth, which is very close to the Muslim Brotherhood, is vocally pro-unity and considers the idea of dividing Yemen to be un-Islamic.
The problem is not only that there are various and conflicting visions for the Yemeni state, but the label Al-Harak disguises the deep divisions between the various factions of the southern movement. Ali Nasir Muhammad and Heider Al-Attas support the National Dialogue and the establishment of federalism or confederalism with a referendum on independence in five years’ time. Ali Salim Al-Beidh, former president of South Yemen, refuses to participate in the National Dialogue unless the purpose is to negotiate an immediate north—south division. Al-Beidh is based in Beirut and is close to the Iranian leadership. The only consensus within Al-Harak is their opposition to centralization, which has a very poor record. Whether or not the blame for all Yemen’s political, economic, and social problems can be laid at the door of Saleh’s government, none of the southern leaders wants to see a return to the previous status quo.
On the other hand, the lack of unity among southerners may well prove to be a temporary lifeboat for Yemen’s territorial integrity. Without a common vision, Al-Harak will likely lack the kind of political leverage needed to pressurize the Yemeni government to concede to a loose federal system with the goal of eventual independence. Furthermore, given that nobody really knows what the popular will is in the south regarding the options of centralism, federalism, and independence, Al-Harak still lacks the legitimacy to claim a mandate for establishing loose federalism or immediate independence.
Although much of this has passed largely unnoticed abroad, recent developments serve as a reminder of the importance not only to begin the National Dialogue as soon as possible, but also to ensure an acceptable outcome for all parties involved. Last month witnessed the rise of sectarian strife, including a bomb attack carried out against a group of Zaydi Muslims which was recently covered in The Majalla. There have been various acts of sabotage against energy and communication infrastructure all over the country, as well as political assassinations, as reported by Yemeni journalist Nasser Arrabyee. These assassinations are allegedly the work of Saleh’s associates, attempting to undermine the position of Hadi, Yemen’s acting president. Maintaining the international pressure over any actors working to undermine this process will be vital. These are crucial times for Yemen.
