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This article does not in any sense recommend military intervention in Syria. But it is essential that hypothetical options are considered systematically as much to inform decisions not to intervene as to offer this possibility. If, as is likely, the Assad regime continues its slaughter of civilians, there will be growing political pressure on governments across the world to ‘do something about it’. Since the early 1990s the international community has increasingly accepted that the responsibility to protect is a general principle governing multinational actions that should be adopted for the future of the planet as much as to stop specific atrocities against people. But the use of military force is always a catalyst for chaos and unpredictable outcomes could mean far greater suffering. Nothing new here.
[inset_left]What experienced nation would be the framework nation for an operation of this size? [/inset_left]
There are four broad categories of military ‘purpose’ and action that could apply to Syria. The first and mildest in terms of risk and consequences would be intervention by a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force for policing, monitoring and removal of arms. For this operation to be a possibility the Security Council would need to reach a consensus. So China and Russia would have to be on board. Other countries opposed to intervention such as Iran would at least need to agree to ‘constructive abstention’ in the debate. A UN force would be very vulnerable to irregular warfare sponsored by an external state. A truce on the ground would be a requirement so the Assad government would need to give assent as would the oppositions in all their forms. And agreement as to at least an outline plan for the future governance of Syria would be necessary. If the truce broke down or proved to be ineffective, this force would withdraw. The average number of troops in present UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations led operations is about 5,000 per intervention. The exact numbers that would be required would depend on the precise mission and the robustness of the truce.
A second category would be UN sanctioned peace enforcement. It is unlikely that this option would be realistic unless the rebels had made some substantial advances. If they had, for instance, seized some large towns and cities and gained realistic military control over substantial areas of territory; forcing a stalemate. Security Council consensus and a UN mandate would be essential because external powers such as Russia might otherwise intervene independently with the prospect of an international war on Syrian territory. There would be the problem of the management of Iran (and perhaps Israel) to prevent uncoordinated interventions or the provision of support to parties on the ground. One must understand that peace enforcement would only be feasible if there was general acquiescence among the parties on the ground. Also a peace enforcement operation is one in which the intervening forces may have to use large scale combat if this acquiescence collapses. Both in Syria and internationally there must be a clear understanding that this force is capable of dominating escalation if fighting at a level beyond small scraps breaks out. The numbers required for effective peace enforcement could be of the order of 120,000 if the UN and NATO interventions in Bosnia are taken as a model—bearing in mind that Syria’s population is some five times larger.
Combat support to rebel forces—the proxy war—would be a third category of intervention. The Libya model in which air power in particular was used, ostensibly to protect civilians but in reality in weakening Qadhafi’s forces and coercing his regime, has been widely discussed in relation to Syria. But it might not only be air power in the form of fighter jets and sea, land and air launched missile systems. Special forces and elite airborne and amphibious infantry might be used for reconnaissance but also against the regime itself, as well as other discrete capabilities that the rebels lack—such as airborne surveillance and unmanned combat aircraft. Of course neither Libya, nor indeed the coercive air operations in Kosovo, are reasonable scenarios for Syria which is much more densely populated and the Syrian Arab Army is already embedded in the urban areas. If air strikes were to be militarily effective, there would be very high levels of civilian casualties and the reason for the intervention would be compromised. That is not to say that military support could not be given to the rebels effectively. A condition would once again be, however, that they had made substantial progress and controlled territory and urban areas. The scale of external force contributions to a proxy war would depend very much on the situation at the time of the intervention. NATO flew some 27,000 air sorties in Libya. Syria would be very much more complex environment, and this could constrain rather than increase the number of sorties.
The final category is a full scale invasion of Syria to bring about regime change along the lines of the 2003 US-led war in Iraq. It is almost impossible to see the diplomatic and political circumstances under which such an operation would be possible. The numbers of civilian casualties might be huge and from a moral viewpoint early surrender by the Assad regime could not be assumed in minimizing this risk. An initial aerial ‘shock and awe’ campaign against, say, Damascus, to bring about a change of heart in the government would be as stupid now as it was in 2003 bearing in mind that it is the Syrian communities (in all their complexity) who would be terrified—and they would subsequently be problematic for occupation forces. The military forces would need to be very competent and interoperable if they were to ‘win’ the combat phase. What experienced nation would be the framework nation for an operation of this size? (That nation would have to provide a large proportion of the troops; because that is the only way it could possibly work). Not the US, for all the obvious external diplomatic and internal political reasons reinforced by Administration rhetoric. Nor France and the United Kingdom together as the core of a European force; for the same reasons even if they could muster the capabilities. France has historic associations with Syria but these could be as much a dis-incentive to lead an intervention. Israel would be completely inappropriate. Neither Turkey nor Saudi Arabia have the experience of leading major interventions. And then there is the matter of access: From which adjoining countries would it be diplomatically feasible and appropriate? The sea option requires great competence – the combination of good quality and appropriate military equipment, versatility, realistic training and, most importantly experience in military intervention in complex emergencies.
Most of the problems of a full scale intervention— leadership, competence, access—apply also to a peace enforcement operation. And two fundamental issues in both cases is scale of forces, particularly on the ground and long term commitment by the supplying nations. If a UN peacekeeping force or a proxy war fails, it is back to the drawing board. But an intervention requiring military control on the ground requires force levels that could prevail in combat and enduring commitment. The Syrian armed forces are substantial and are reasonably well equipped. An opposed military intervention cannot rely on maneuver theory—the ability to surprise and coerce—if it is to be conducted at risk levels that will be acceptable to participating nations and the international community and will minimize casualties. Winning is of course not about numbers alone but the old metrics of the Cold War matter. To keep risk low a ground invasion force would need to be three to five times the size of the forces the Syrian Arab Army could muster to defend Syria. Coalition forces committed some 540,000 ground troops to the liberation of Kuwait in 1991. The ground intervention in Iraq in 2003 was about half this number. In the case of Syria at least 300,000 would be realistic. Every bit as important are the numbers of intervention troops that would be available to occupy and subsequently stabilize the country after any combat phase. These numbers apply to peace enforcement forces as well. Once again, whatever the competence of the intervening forces and the quality of their counter-insurgency doctrine, the decision on the ratio of troops to population should bear in mind the levels of the International Security Assistance Force in Kosovo in 1999, not Iraq in 2003, nor Afghanistan before the 2010 US surge. A low risk figure based on the Kosovo ratio would be half a million troops.
