[caption id="attachment_55229380" align="aligncenter" width="620" caption="Protesters in Berlin against military action in Iran (PA)"]
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The United Nations and its individual members have adopted a series of increasingly severe economic and other sanctions aimed at impeding Tehran’s ability to acquire the technologies, equipment, and other materials needed for Iran’s nuclear program. Despite the sanctions, the Iranian government continues to make progress toward a nuclear weapons capability and remains securely in power despite internal discontent. Nonetheless, the sanctions will continue in the absence of a superior alternative.
Evidence exists that the sanctions are having some effects on Tehran’s behaviour. More and more foreign businesses are ceasing to engage in commerce with Iran for fear of running afoul of international sanctions that would impede their access to more lucrative Western markets. And foreign governments like India are having trouble paying for their purchases due to Iran’s exclusion from most international banking networks. Furthermore, others countries such as China are demanding hefty discounts for any future purchases.
After having ignored the sanctions for years, Iranian leaders have been denouncing them more vehemently and even threating self-defeating military actions, such as closing the gulf to oil shippers. At the same time, Iranian representatives have appeared more eager to resume nuclear negotiations to avert additional sanctions. Most importantly, Iran’s nuclear program is proceeding more slowly than that of previous nuclear weapons states.
But the historically slow pace of Iran’s nuclear program could be due to Tehran’s having not yet committed to pursuing nuclear weapons, or to divisions within the Iranian elite on this question.
Some Iranian leaders might want nuclear weapons for defensive reasons—to deter foreign military threats. Other Iranian leaders might seek nuclear weapons for offensive purposes—to intimidate neighbors, affirm Iran’s regional primacy, and provide a shield against United States military intervention while Tehran uses proxy non-state actors such as Hezbollah to expand its regional influence in Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen, and elsewhere.
In contrast, other Iranian leaders are thought to fear that more visibly pursuing a nuclear weapons capacity could increase foreign sanctions and other international punishments at a time when Iran will soon hold parliamentary elections, an opportune occasion for a renewal of mass protests against the regime.
Iran's nuclear activities also suffer from design-related technical flaws, inadequate quality control, and deliberate foreign sabotage through cyber attacks and the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists. Finally, the Iranian government may be proceeding slowly in order to keep its nuclear intentions ambiguous pending a decision to actually seek a nuclear weapons capacity, and avoid alarming the international community even further, which could galvanize stronger sanctions or even a military response.
One advantage of having the UN Security Council adopt sanctions against Iran is that member states can cite them to legitimize applying even harsher sanctions against Tehran. Various governments, especially the United States and European Union, have indeed supplemented these UN-mandated sanctions with their own national or multinational sanctions.
But these supplementary sanctions have provoked tensions within the international community. Russia, China, and other governments refuse to accept their legitimacy. These governments cannot veto these sanctions, as Beijing and Moscow can with proposed UN measures, but their firms are often sanctioned by them despite their lack of consent to these measures. Yet, Western governments do not want to allow other foreign firms to “backfill” for Western companies forced to end their business ties with Iran.
In any case, neither supplementary nor UN sanctions have had much effect in impeding Tehran’s nuclear activities. Although there have been periodic slowdowns in the pace of Iran’s expanding enrichment capacity, its nuclear weapons capabilities continue to improve.
Sanctioning Iran is still considered the most effective policy option readily available to those concerned about Tehran’s potential nuclear ambitions. Efforts at negotiation run into the problem that many influential Iranians are deeply committed to making progress in developing nuclear technologies. In addition, past Western diplomatic initiatives are stymied by the Iranian elite, where divisions are so deep that anyone who proposes major Iranian concessions is denounced as a traitor.
At the same time, Iran’s nuclear program has progressed sufficiently far that a limited military strike—such as the earlier Israeli air strikes against Iraq and Syria--would probably prove insufficient. A Desert Storm-type air campaign would result in Iran’s resuming its program, with even greater effort, as soon as the bombing ended. The only plausible military option would be an Iraq 2003-style massive invasion and military occupation of all of Iran, which would allow the occupiers to track down and destroy all of Iran’s nuclear assets. Obviously, few people have the stomach to pursue that option.
So the sanctions will continue in the hopes that they at least will delay Iran’s nuclear march, weaken Iran’s nuclear potential, and contribute to a change in the regime’s policies or the regime itself. Raising the costs Tehran pays for developing nuclear technologies with potential military applications also helps discourage other governments from pursuing nuclear weapons.
