The Last Interview part III

The Last Interview part III

[caption id="attachment_55226796" align="alignleft" width="300" caption="The young Bassiouni (r) pictured with Anwar Sadat"]The young Bassiouni (r) pictured with Anwar Sadat[/caption]

To read part one of this interview please click here

To read part two click here

The Majalla: What makes the Egyptian Revolution different from the other Arab revolutions?

What makes the Egyptian Revolution dissimilar to the other revolutions is that the Egyptian army stood in with the people and the revolution. While in Libya and in Syria, to give an example, the military stood against its own people. If it were not for the Egyptian military support, the revolution would have not been a success.

Q: What are your thoughts on the future of the Arab uprisings, especially those that received assistance from foreign entities to bring down regimes?

With deepest regret, the Arab armies are now no longer serviceable. In Iraq, for example, the army was strong and used to pose a threat to Israel from the Eastern front. It now no longer exists. The Syrian army is occupied with the situation there, which depletes its powers. Moreover, both Sudan and Yemen have disintegrated into smaller states and the army in Libya no longer exists. The only army that is still present is the Egyptian army. We need to aid the Egyptian army to move its powers back into the barracks and to serve its purpose in defending the country.

Q: What is the best way to ensure a good future for Egypt?

By developing the basis for the new government and the new constitution, with a clear outline that limits the president’s authorities and strengthens the trend towards democracy, as well as devising a healthy electoral system that would transform the country into a modern democracy.

There is no doubt that this process will take a long time. Change will happen gradually as we are now in the transitional phase, which requires that we put our hands together, even with a new president with a limited mandate and authority.

Q: Is Egypt’s national security at risk?

We are headed the right direction, so far. However, any level of indiscretion will have an affect on national security, which does not have to be of a military nature only, but it could have other economic, health-related or political dimensions. For example, if the Egyptian stock market collapses, the national security will be jeopardised. Similarly, frequent demonstrations and strikes would disrupt work and productivity and consequently impair national security.

Q: As a former liaison officer between the Egyptian and Syrian armies in the October War, how would you describe the current Syrian situation?

This matter would be best tackled by the Arab League, as it had taken a position towards the matter, devised a plan, and sent its Secretary General to Syria to deliver a solution to the conflict and stop the aggression. However, Syria did not interact with the Arab League or any of its friendly states towards finding a solution.

Q: Do you believe that the position taken by the Arab League is sufficient enough to deal with the level of crisis in Syria?

The Arab League’s position could be described as a ‘no comment’ position. The Arab Leagues position was different and stronger towards Libya, as it agreed to the intervention by the NATO forces.

Q: Does this mean that you believe that a NATO intervention is necessary in Syria?

The situation is complicated as Syria is receiving Russian support. Russia will not vote for a military intervention in Syria at the Security Council. Thus, NATO will not act in absence of consent from the permanent members of the council. Syria also receives financial, military and logistical support from Iran. Consequently, the Syrian situation is totally dissimilar to that of Libya and a repeat of the Libyan state of affairs cannot be achieved in Syria.

Q: Supposing that there is no Russian and Iranian backing of Syria, based on your experience in security, would you agree to a military intervention in Syria—given Syria's critical and sensitive position?

Syria’s position is, of course, critical. I personally think that even if NATO were to take measures against Syria, the situation in will extend further and for a longer period of time than in Libya’s case. In that situation the army was divided and was partially led by Qadhafi’s sons. Also, some of the Libyan army divisions joined the rebels. Whereas, the superior organisation of the army in Syria renders the situation more intricate.

Q: What is your analysis of the situation in Libya?

The situation in Libya is disturbing. The Libyan case is not yet resolved. The use of only air force is not sufficient to settle the battle. Ground forces should be deployed. However, this is quite difficult given Libya’s geographical nature and tribal disposition.

Q: Is there a threat to Libya and its neighbouring countries from Al-Qaeda control?

The main threat comes from the Libyan tribes in their fight for control over the Libyan oil wells and from their rivalry for power, seeing as the Libyan army is no longer present, thus, the Libyan people remain unprotected. The Libyan situation forewarns a disaster.

Q: You witnessed the Iranian Revolution and the downfall of the Shah when you worked as a diplomat in Iran. What do you remember from those times?

The Americans applied pressure on the Shah for a swift transition from a dictatorship to democracy. President Carter rushed the matter. I believe that such haste leads to destruction. It is like providing a patient with a whole container of medicine— a terminal dose—instead of administering small doses.

In those days—and before the revolution—Iranian intelligence (SAVAK) worked closely with US intelligence to counteract the expansion of communism, but failed to discern the religious tidal wave. The result was an unexpected, uncontrolled and non-combatable religious escalation. Consequently, and following the revolution and the downfall of the Shah, Khomeini took over the rule of Iran, the thing that heavily damaged the relations between Iran and the US.
font change