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Recent statements made by Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, that the Haqqani network is a “veritable arm” of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI, has prompted a stark warning from the Pakistani government that if the accusations continue, the US will lose an ally.
Admiral Mullen’s remarks were made in a US Armed Services Committee hearing on 22 September, during which he also alleged that the ISI provided support to the Haqqani network in its attack against the US embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul a week prior. According to the admiral, the US has “credible intelligence” that the Haqqani network was also behind a truck bomb attack on a coalition base and an earlier attack against the Intercontinental Hotel, both in Kabul.
Assuming that Adm. Mullen is speaking truthfully, I would like to know why the US has allied itself so closely with a government that “exports violence,” as Adm. Mullen says, and worse, provides support, however little, to extremist groups that count the US as one of their primary targets.
Naturally, I am not the only one expressing concern over this issue. In July this year, Congress voted to withhold about $800m of US military aid until Pakistan moved against key destabilizing elements in its territory. Most recently, one day prior to the admiral’s congressional testimony, the Senate Appropriations Committee voted to condition all US aid to Pakistan on Pakistani military action against the Haqqani network, but it still requires approval from Congress.
The US-Pakistan relationship, though longstanding, is especially complex, and has more often than not been characterized by deep mistrust and lately, hostility. Ten long years of war in Afghanistan, including US covert operations into Pakistani territory, such as the raid into Osama Bin Laden’s compound in May this year, along with a significant increase in drone strikes there—118 of them in 2010—have made this relationship almost unbearable, particularly for the Pakistani people; but apparently crucial to US objectives in region. In return for over $2bn in security assistance to Pakistan annually, the US is permitted to use the country to transport military supplies into Afghanistan. As important, the US relies on the Pakistani Army to fight extremist groups operating and taking refuge in its territory.
Though the Pakistani government has fulfilled many of its obligations, it has so far refused to take action against the Haqqani network, despite US threats to cut aid. Considering this, and the fact that the ISI had sponsored the Haqqanis in the past, one can only infer that the relationship still exists at the expense of security in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Despite such a troubled, almost unjustifiable relationship, US officials continue to insist that it must remain: "There is no choice but to maintain a relationship with Pakistan. Why? Because we are fighting a war there. We are fighting Al-Qaeda there. And they do give us some co-operation in that effort. Because they do represent an important force in that region. Because they do happen to be a nuclear power that has nuclear weapons, and we have to be concerned about what happens with those nuclear weapons,” CIA chief Leon Panetta said at a joint public forum with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on 16 August. “So for all of those reasons, we've got to maintain a relationship with Pakistan.”
The problem here is that it is not in Pakistan’s short-term interests to take action against a group or groups that might prove integral to its regional plans, namely a weaker India and increased influence in Afghanistan So we arrive at a point where the US relationship with Pakistan is no longer viable. As long as Pakistan remains defiant to US demands in this regard, which are, in a rare moment, quite reasonable, the US should not hold up its part of the deal. In fact, it ought to change the terms of the relationship altogether.
First and foremost, the US needs to recognize the fact that the Pakistani government is not its friend, nor is it a friend of the Pakistani people—though it acknowledges the importance of public opinion. If US officials can approach the relationship as such, then expectations will be significantly lower. With this in mind, the US should begin to reconcile with the Pakistani people—73 percent of whom have an unfavorable opinion of the US—through a comprehensive PR campaign, which might include formal apologies and compensation for families who have lost loved ones, in consort with the halting of all drone strikes and covert operations in Pakistani territory.
A reduction of aid to $1bn, and the redirection of half of it to Pakistan’s rehabilitation program that aims to de-indoctrinate radicals and re-integrate them back into society, and the other half to the protection of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal, if permitted, would send a strong message to the Pakistani government that the US is sincere in its efforts to make amends, but also that it will not tolerate Pakistani intransigence.
Meanwhile, the US must find a different military supply route into Afghanistan. One option is to increase the scope of cooperation with the Central Asian Republics (CARs), which are currently facilitating the transfer of “non-lethal” items into Afghanistan. The fact that they do not permit the transit of lethal items and equipment should not deter the US from pressing them. It would need to work this out with Russia, which does not want a US presence in the CARs region, but perhaps the US has not explored all of its options in this matter.
Finally, the US should continue to pull out of Afghanistan, with no troops remaining by 2014. Analysts are certain that Pakistan will remain a major player in Afghanistan for years to come. So be it. It’s time to move on.
